BOOK III, Part 7: APRIL 1944: ETO – European Theater

A. CHAPTER 3 & 4 Supreme Command, Pogue; Nature and Machinery of SHAEF April 1944 xyza

SHAEF, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force was formed in February 1944. It was a combination of Eisenhower's Mediterranean Command, the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and Headquarters, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC).

1. Contributions of AFHQ. Eisenhower ruthlessly insisted upon officers with a correct mindset of fully teamwork with British officers and *vice versa*. Deputy Supreme Commander, Air Chief Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Commander stated the criteria:

> … General Eisenhower had developed an integrated command in which British or U.S. officers of a staff division could make decisions affecting forces of either nationality. Officers were carefully selected for their ability to fit … The task … involved "getting the right people and being ruthless … (if) a man does not fit he will never learn the language and you will never make a team; that is the guts of the whole thing, the team …"

Eisenhower demanded an Allied headquarters. His men in SHAEF **56** who were sold on Allied co-operation. Command of the Mediterranean Theater grounded Ike in politics, occupation, civil and military affairs, press relations, psychological warfare, air-to-ground cooperation. He was the only true Theater Commander the Allies had. His selection should have been automatic. He brought a large contingent staff with him to England as well as the Montgomery, Bradley and Canadian staff. **(57)**

2. Contributions of COSSAC. COSSAC provided a Supreme HQ staff knowledgeable in SHAEFE issues. Gen Morgan was Eisenhower's Chief of Staff before Ike was appointed. He arranged headquarters at Norfolk House, London, where he and his deputy, Gen Barker (U.S.), selected future SHAEF staff. Morgan shaped the staff to fit U.S. protocols (**58***)* Gen Barker assumed much of the work and U.S. deputy chiefs for operations and supply were installed. Members of Eisenhower's civil affairs, psychological warfare and publicity moved to England. In September 1943, Marshall directed Gen

Devers to set up an initial staff for the new commander (Marshall then thought he was the nominee). He suggested Morgan as the chief of staff, and British officers for intelligence and administration, but a U.S. officer for operations, etc. Marshall wanted robust air and army staffs sufficient to keep these commands under control. **59** Eisenhower's deputy, Gen Smith knew civil affairs, press relations, psychological warfare and other staff activities. He filled slots with Eisenhower's selections. It seems Ike denuding the Mediterranean of staff officers. Selectees had to be faithful to the "allied" concept. Of course, Morgan's staff resented newcomers from the Mediterranean who were a bit "cocky", and some adjustment was required, but SHAEF functioned.

3. The Chief Deputies. The British chose the deputy Supreme Commander and wisely it was Air Marshal Tedder, **60** the British Middle East air commander that halted Rommel Egyptian efforts. He led the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces with high esteem known to use the Air as "spearhead artillery" making enemy vulnerable. Under Tedder's air-ground cooperation hit unknown highs. A reasonable risk

taker, he would invade Europe only after complete air supremacy and strategic bombing of Germany. He was a coordinator without a large staff as he mainly chaired daily staff meetings from which he exercised substantial control. **61** He also attended Eisenhower's daily conferences as his Deputy Supreme Commander and chief aviator. He served Eisenhower collaborating 1) all Allied air; 2) air service to ground forces and 3) liaison Eisenhower to British Chiefs on all war matters. His #1 job was: to make sure ground commanders asked for and received air support.

The second main cog in Eisenhower's organization was his U.S. Chief of Staff, Gen Bedell Smith, who had served as General Staff Secretary at the War Department. He knew the rules, had contacts, new "short-cuts", "friendly ears" and he unfailingly supported Eisenhower. Tough and rough, but also smooth who performed his "hatchet man" bad news tasks with aplomb. He represented and "guarded" Eisenhower by controlling his correspondence, limiting access to Eisenhower -- **62** personal and belligerent scheduler and key communicator with Churchill and the British Chiefs. He replaced COSSAC's Gen Morgan. Ike offered Morgan a corps to command, but Morgan chose to be Smith's assistant Chief of Staff -- which he admirably performed. **63** Smith said he was "his British alter ego, 'a man I wouldn't willingly have dispensed with.'" **64-65**

4. The Powers Reserved to SHAEF. Montgomery had operational control of Allied forces at first while Eisenhower focused on major strategic plans, and air and naval support. Few realized his broad powers for SHAEF to coordinate both interservice and inter-Allied supply policy on a huge range of issues (*i.e.,* hiring labor, supplies, welfare, health, discipline and awards, prisoners, movements, and airfield construction. SHAEF prepared logistic plans, allocated resources, national policy matters with non-U.S. and British agencies, coordinated U.S. and British ministries and departments on policy and materiel that had impact upon the ETO = **B-r-o-a-d!**

In the "political sphere", Eisenhower's office could delegate little. He represented the U.S. and U.K., **66-67** had to set civil affairs for France, Belgium and Netherlands, had to govern Germany, plus press relations, censorship, military governments and psychological warfare. He had long-range planning for the lodgement, final drive into Germany and surrender of Germany. By D-Day, his staff was already planning crossing the Rhine River.

5. The Operations Division. The SHAEFE nerve center was the G-3 Division for planning and operations. The planning section was created mid-March 1944 primarily to coordinate plans of the 21st Army Group, the naval and air force commands. SHAEFE worked on post-invasion plans, action plans if Germany surrendered and for forcing the Seine and, above all, for a course of action to be followed after the capture of the lodgment area. While much invasion planning was by the ground, navy, and air commanders' offices, SHAEFE did "Post-OVERLORD Planning". **68-69** Its Operations Section directed resistance activities, "cooperated" with the Psychological Warfare Division, and drafted "communiques" and summary reports. It kept the SHAEFE War Room information collected on the conflict. It had liaison staffs at other headquarters reporting information. **70** The SHAEFE G-3 was in constant contact with Gen de Guingand, the 21 Army Group chief of staff to manage operational questions.

Initially, Eisenhower relied on the staffs of Gen Montgomery and Bradley and major forces from other services. Otherwise, the was not heavily involved in the early days of the attack.

6. The Intelligence Division. Eisenhower had Gen Strong head his Intelligence Division. Strong was an attaché in Germany before the war but was assigned to the British until late May 1944 when

Eisenhower finally obtained Gen Strong. SHAEFE did not itself perform intelligence. G-2 received and reviewed intelligence reports. **71** As with other branches, it acted as a "larger picture" assembly point for intelligence. It published weekly reports to provide a uniform information flow as assembler, collator, and distributor for theater intelligence data. **72**

7. Administration or Services of Supply. Supply was a SHAEFE oversight matter, because each nation used different types and methods. The SHAEFE G-1 and G-4 sections had very minimal operational control. SHAEFE was not responsible for British supplies and HQ ETOUSA managed Army supply matters. Cutting to the "punch line" the British controlled their own separate supply chain and Eisenhower had little to say over his own S.O.S. supply services as the SHAEFE Commander but did have clout as the U.S. Theater Commander. As mentioned, the ETO S.O.S. officer was the same Gen J.C.H. Lee who had gained fame building U.S. Army bases. Gen Lee was a constant embarrassment and source of frustration for Eisenhower both in his role as the commander of SHAEFE and of ETOUSA. He never corralled Lee whose legend was of being bold, brash and embarrassing. Much is written of Gen Lee; little is complimentary. Gen Somervell, the SOS Commander, **73** approved of his work and Gen Lee remained in charge throughout the war. The author states that supply was:

> … actually, controlled by Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee, deputy theater commander for supply and administration … General Lee was also slated to command Headquarters, Communications Zone … established on the Continent after the invasion … The exact responsibility of the G-I and G-4 at SHAEF and their counterparts at U.S. supply headquarters was never thoroughly defined … Staff officers at SHAEF were never completely successful in their efforts to control supply and personnel policy relating solely to U.S. forces. **74**

Having said that, Gen Lee quickly disappeared from the Army roles as WWII ended!

8. Civil Affairs in Formerly Occupied Countries and in Germany. Mr. Pogue devotes significant effort concerning the complex task of creating civil affairs officers to restore utilities and law, and to feed liberated peoples in occupied nations and Germany. At this time, the issues of displaced refugees were only dim, distant problems poorly perceived and planned. The horrors and human toll of WW2 are still indescribable, but that exceeds the scope of this effort. There is, an excellent (if not lengthy) 900 page "official" history of *"Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors"*, Coles, Harry L. and Weinberg, Albert K. (CMH 11-3, 1964)[3] **75**

B. CHAPTER 5 and 6: Supreme Command: Pogue; Planning before Eisenhower

1. Lack of LST's (Author). In August 1943 it was universally agreed a much larger assault was required -- nothing was done. Reasons are not revealed. Early Montgomery plans had landings at **108** Dieppe, Le Havre, and Brest (100's of miles apart) using all ANVIL craft plus more. At every turn, lack of landing craft stunted his plans. This "tight budget" is not explained when Allied theory required an "overwhelming force". From COSSAC's first efforts, lack of landing craft was always a "critical path" for success. How could this be other than neglect? The navies knew ship numbers and types, but not landing craft. The numbers of LST's and LSI's built bore little relation to the number of divisions required.

[3] //history.army.mil/books/wwii/civaff/index.htm. Additionally, Pogue's treatment of the Adjutant General, Signal, Engineer and other to\pics are omitted. *See pp. 84-89.*

Central to this issue was the process of "drying out" shipping. The English Channel had "extreme tides" of 15 to 20 feet, so every six hours saw two hours of calm water and four hours of currents as tides raised or lowered at the astounding rates of 4 to 5 feet per hour! Normally 5 feet was greater than a "normal" tide. A ship cannot be "snugged" to a pier with such a variance. A ship with a 25 feet of depth needed a pier 50 feet tall! The major ports had "lock gates" to "locked in" the port at high tides.

Smaller ports used "coaster" ships with strong hulls that sat dry shod on the bottom low tides -- "drying out". Extreme tides existed on the French Channel Coast. Knowing "coaster" ships had to dry out, the U.S. build the "Landing Ship Tank" or "Infantry" (LST and LSI) without with reinforced keels. They were "ships" because they could cross the Atlantic under their own power where "craft" were crossed on the decks of ships.

But they were "Landing" Ships that could not "land" due to the extreme tides. They should have been designed to "coaster" specifications. LST's and LCI's were not evaluated to see if they could lay "dry shod" on the beach without damaging their keels. Consequently, the Allies built expensive, massive concrete and steel artificial harbors to unload LST's, LCI's and smaller ships while Liberty Ship sizes, because of their depth, were unloaded from anchorages into the amphibian DUKW's and other landing "craft" such as the LCT's 4 and 5.

Second, one LST was worth 10 LCT's in cargo and troop capacity, but in early 1944, the Allies had too many small craft, too few landing ships and an insufficient invasion fleet in a war where every campaign required amphibious assaults! This does not detract from the need for "landing craft", particularly the LCT's (tanks), LCI's (infantry) or even the DUKW amphibious trucks since all were used to ferry cargo from regular cargo ships anchored out to and on the shore.

2. <u>Lack of LST's and the TORCH Invasion.</u> Per Pogue's history, landing craft issues hindered all invasion planning, especially ANVIL for south France. January 1944 discussion ranged between no ANVIL or up to a three-division ANVIL. **109** Eisenhower wanted a complimentary ANVIL attack on Southern France. **110** But increasing OVERLORD from three to five divisions was more important to obtain attack with a certain "mass" for "momentum". Adding new U.S. divisions every three days permitted an "organized" German response, not a "panicky" reaction. Conversely, five Allied divisions would likely overwhelm the coast defenses, but not inland defenses. Eisenhower wanted more force at Quistreham (east), Cotentin Peninsula (west) and an airborne division near Caen (west) -- a huge increase, plus he wanted a three-division ANVIL for South France. *(Comment: Yet nowhere are there criticisms of Eisenhower's demands. He nearly doubled plans from 4 to 7 divisions – If reasonable then for Eisenhower, why were they not reasonable from the start?).* He agreed to a delay to gain more strength. The British agreed but questioned South France. Fortunes in Italy (as just set forth above) frowned increasing OVERLORD. **111** Plans for South France LST's were muddled with the British "lukewarm" on ANVIL. They argued Anzio was sufficient to divert Germans from Normandy, France. Churchill assaulted ANVIL as too remote to assist OVERLORD and, in lockstep his Chiefs. proposed ANVIL be canceled.

Yet, U.S. Chiefs were suspicious of British "political" aims in Italy. The "march of events" was "too convenient." By May 1943 U.S. Chiefs feared Italy would "swallow the men and landing craft" for

Europe. They agreed to Sicily in 1943 for a lack of alternatives, but Salerno and now Anzio **112** followed. Marshall questioned Eisenhower's motives: "I merely wish to be certain that localities is not developing and that pressure on you has not warped your judgment." It irked "Ike". In truth, Americans concluded landing ships and craft in Britain were good for a 7-division assault – enough for OVERLORD and ANVIL. The problem was logistics and the simple, amazingly unknown answer, of: "How much can an LST really carry?" The Allies had a huge assault center at Slapton Sands and loaded LST's were sailing the Atlantic, but the answer as to **how much could be carried was unknown!** Rather than tests, the British and SHAEF invited the U.S. Chiefs to London, but they declined to send Adm. Cooke, Jr., and Gen Hull.

The dispute lasted through February. The two advisors reported the British were against ANVIL using LST's as an excuse. Incredibly, the argument raged when neither side knew how much theses craft would carry. It turned out in actually loading the carried more freight. Montgomery still objected to South France, **113** but Eisenhower, Adm Ramsay and Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory convinced Montgomery to concur. In the end, Eisenhower informed the British "by making sacrifices and accepting every possible risk", the two invasions could be simultaneously launched.

That solved, the worsening Anzio Italian battle scene (above described) made a June ANVIL precarious. The British predictably said shortchanging Italy was "wholly unjustifiable…" to demand canceling Anvil. U.S. Chiefs agreed to a 1 April review, but FDR was adamant that ANVIL be launched. He had promised it to Stalin meaning he would not "**abandon … ANVIL without taking the matter up with that third power … The Supreme Commander's position thus became increasingly difficult** … "He had to argue the U.S. Chiefs' position and cajole the British when he did not fully agree with either of "his bosses". He suggested the U.S. might accept an ANVIL "diversionary operation" – a feint with no invasion. By this artifice, the British agreed to continue ANVIL planning.

On 26 February, a 20 March decision ANVIL deadline was set for **114** ts landing craft to go from Italy to the U.K. for OVERLORD. ANVIL depended upon Italy's war that was bleak. Commander Gen Wilson reported heavy casualties and near exhaustion on 22 February. SHAEF planners knew ANVIL would be canceled. Then Italian commanders requested OVERLORD craft. Not only was Eisenhower short for ANVIL, BUT OVERLORD was ALSO threatened. **115** By 20 March ANVIL was just a one-division attack, and more likely a feint with no one was happy. U.S. Chiefs postponed it, but British Chiefs could not "kill it". The U.S. set a 10 July deadline and diverted more landing ships from the Pacific. Brooke objected: the U.S. was "pointing a pistol." Eisenhower convinced British Gen Brooke U.S. Chiefs had made substantial concessions. The Americans requested Gen Wilson (Mediterranean Commander) prepare ANVIL and Italy plans. They were upset over British priorities in Italy stating the British wanted the "legacy" without the terms of the "will." Churchill **116** sought another ANVIL postponement, but Marshall demanded immediate ANVIL preparations.

Yet, the British won the round when 18 April when the CCS directed Gen Wilson to: (a) launch an all-out Italian offensive, (b) make threats to south France; and (c) ensure "best possible" use of Italy craft in south France or elsewhere that did not prejudice Italy. OVERLORD gained more amphibious shipping; ANVIL was postponed. The British won a late ANVIL and on-going Italian Campaign. The failure to settle Mediterranean strategy promised further controversy. **117**

3. Gen Omar Bradley to Europe.[4] Gen Omar Bradley transferred to England after Sicily to command the 1st U.S. Army and future 12th Army Group. He arrived October 1943, three months before Montgomery. Still Montgomery became the Allied Commander in January 1944. Bradley was little involved in early invasion planning to focus upon training U.S. troops for his three corps: V Corps was under Leonard T. Gerow whom Bradley knew; VII Corps had J. Lawton Collins a division commander from the Pacific whom Bradley also knew, and XIX Corps had Charles H. Corlett. Bradley uniquely saw the value of airborne to lead the fight to get the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to UTAH Beach. Bradley supervised plans and training, and selected the 1st ID, 29th ID and 4th ID along with the 82nd and 101st Airborne for E-Day. He opted to not most of the beach vehicles British Gen Percy Hobart invented, other than the swimming Sherman tanks. Pogue wrote: "Some have contended that this decision to keep a lean supply system cost the lives of many soldiers who died from mines and booby traps on the Normandy beaches and during the subsequent breakout."

4. Increase of Airborne Units in the Assault. Bradley and Montgomery sought a larger invading force. The south Cotentin Peninsula was flooded lowland swamps. Behind Utah Beach was a complete swamp with four "causeway" roads leading to higher land. The attack had to clear these beach roads, halt German reinforcements and isolate enemy forces in the north Cotentin from joining. Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory asserted too few planes for parachutes and gliders. Eisenhower needed two airborne divisions D-Day -- a third in 24 hours. Air staff claimed lack of plane crews. Eisenhower dropped to one and one-third air divisions. **118** Gen Arnold wanted to land six airborne divisions far in the German rear as Marshall sent a team to cajole SHAEFE for an air bridgehead at Evreux on the Seine River; 80 miles from Caen -- suicidal. Eisenhower rejected these types of "ideas."

Dried-Out LST's on Beaches

Bradley wanted airborne capturing Cherbourg; Montgomery wanted them at Caen. Cargo planes were the "weak link" so the south France ANVIL was postponed. OVERLORD had U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne and a small 6th British Airborne at Caen. Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory told Eisenhower he violated "official airborne doctrine". Eisenhower was unmoved, but Germans began installing anti-airborne obstacles. **120** Leigh-Mallory said they would wreck 30% of the gliders. If "seaborne assault … depends on the airborne, it will be seriously prejudiced." Eisenhower agreed, so he ordered his recalcitrant airman: "you, the Army Commander, and the Troop Carrier Commander … (must) diminish these hazards." **It was brilliant!**

5. The Revised Plan. OVERLORD had many changes. On 1 February 1944, came the Initial Joint Plan for subordinates to plan. Plans evolved for destroying rail and highway traffic, naval fire upon beach fortifications, increased ground and airborne assaults, and follow-ups to create a firm beachheads. Eisenhower wrote Marshall that until D+60 the operation **121** required everything. The invasion grew to five infantry and most of three airborne divisions plus two more within 50 miles of the landing. Landing craft and air interdictions programs increased. The latter would "wreck the railway and highway communications leading into northwest France." **122**

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[4] See from the Center for Military History, "*Omar Nelson Bradley: the Centennial",*

//history.army.mil/brochures/Bradley/Bradley.htm. Pogue's history treats Gen Bradley at a different point.

C. Chapter 7 SHAEF's Air Problems, Jan-June 1944; Supreme Command, Pogue
xyza April

1. Allied Bomber Commands. Eisenhower foresaw the air problem and fought for his Deputy, Air Chief Marshall Tedder, to command **all Allied air forces.** But Arnold and Harris won when the CCS deferred the decision. Pogue blames British Bomber Commander Harris, but Gen Arnold seemed equally unwilling to "step in" both pro and con. The strategic air campaign was finally succeeding. The British thought V-1 and V-2 buzz bomb and rocket site attacks were succeeding. Spaatz's U.S. bombers claimed success for daylight strategic bombing. Eisenhower wanted his Deputy Commander, Tedder, to be the Allied air commander. Unlike many, Tedder championed ground force air support– a discipline greatly ignored in Arnold's AAF. Yet, by 1944 "close air support" of ground troops was doctrine. Mediterranean events proved the worth of fighters providing infantry "ground support". In Sicily and Italy fighter and medium bombers hit tunnels and bridges to halt German supplies more so than striking front-line enemy. The airmen rarely used fighters to attack German ground forces until Normandy.

Tedder championed "close air support" of ground forces, as air forces chose attacking miles behind to hit supply trucks and trains. By December 1943, Eisenhower was among few who saw the need of air to support ground soldiers. **123** The British ignored him. Late February, Ike sought control of RAF Bomber Command – he controlled USAAF. Churchill punted to Portal, but Eisenhower gave Englishman Tedder charge of Leigh-Mallory, Spaatz, and Bomber Harris on 9 March. **124** British claimed a "Supreme Commander" lacked authority over air forces not assigned him. Eisenhower threatened to resign. He won on **125** 14 April. It was farcical to claim a "supreme" commander lacked "supreme" command! Air forces were ordered to: 1) destroy the German Air Force (GAF) and 2) enemy transportation. V-1 rockets were for the Allied Expeditionary Air Force ("AEAF"). On 1 May Cunningham's 2d Tactical Air Force took control of the British and U.S. tactical air forces for Eisenhower.

On 6 June 1944, Eisenhower controlled RAF Bomber Command, USSTAF (tactical air), and the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces with Ninth U.S. Air Force, the 2d British Tactical Air Force, and Air Defence of Great Britain forces. All were under Tedder's Air Operations Planning Staff of SHAEF. Tactical air force **126** commanders met at Uxbridge with a plotting and Combined Operations Room.

2. Railway Bombing Plan. The most visceral pre-invasion contest involved the railway bombing plan pitting Eisenhower, Tedder, and Leigh-Mallory against the two bomber commanders, the 21st Army Group staff, Prime Minister and War Cabinet. It was a lallapaloosa of a fight, because the "inventor", Prof Solly Zuckerman, was a zoologist or "Zoo man". Zuckerman devised the Italy "railway" campaign for Tedder and did again in Europe. He had a 90-day attack plan against 39 German and 33 French-Belgium rail targets for "dislocating railway systems supplying the enemy forces in the west." Nothing before D-Day caused a greater stir, but Eisenhower stood firm. **127** Two objections: 1) lack of immediate aid to OVERLORD and 2) revulsion by occupied people. The fracas began 12 February as Prof Zukerman laid out the three vital rail nodes: repair, service, and signals. Destroying the "nodes" collapsed the rail system but it mandated 100% of all planes of all types. Cutting main connecting nodes would destroy the rail system. Fierce, vociferous opposition arose from "Bomber" Harris and Gen Spaatz. Both men wanted to make the D-Day invasion a "walk-on" event thus proving strategic bombers could win wars. The unknowns were how effective were attacks and fast could repairs be made?

The dispute bloomed in late February. By early April it seemed doomed by estimates of killing 80,000 to 160,000 French. On 24 March, Tedder reminded they had to destroy the enemy's air forces before D

Day and hinder transport to the lodgment. POINTBLANK focused upon preparing for the invasion **128** using the Spaatz's "oil plan" stating:

> … (The) worth of any plan … (was its aid) to OVERLORD before D Day … (The) scheme to bomb railway marshaling yards and repair centers offered a reasonable prospect of disorganizing enemy movement and supply and made it easier to block traffic with tactical air strikes after D Day … (He) swept aside U.S. proposals … the tonnage of bombs … would be prohibitive, for attacks that would be confined to railway and road bridges.
> … (He favored) POINTBLANK attacks deep into Germany … (against) the German Air Force … (with) remaining air effort … "to help the army get ashore and stay ashore." To achieve this … (was the) second priority for the railway bombing plan … Eisenhower … insisted … the first five or six weeks of OVERLORD were … critical, it was essential … (and the) air forces' greatest contribution … was hindrance of enemy movement…
> ….
> Gen Spaatz now strongly urged the attack on the oil resources … **129** (to) force the German Air Force to fight … Eisenhower … (said) railway bombing plan "meant very little change in the present Bomber Command Program," (and) … could be completed before D Day … (He) Spaatz to consider information which Air Chief Marshal Tedder would supply … (so that he) and the British Chief of the Air Staff would make their final decisions.

Spaatz agreed if Bomber Command agreed, he could use surplus forces for his priorities: (1) German Air Force and ball bearings, (2) rail transportation in occupied areas, and (3) synthetic oil. Zuckerman's had British resistance. Intelligence reported no major impacts on rail traffic; a car shortage had not impacted military movements. The War Cabinet on 3 April took "a grave and … adverse view" over **130** killing to thousands of French civilians. Eisenhower countered that since the French were "now slaves," they had the greater interest in the success of the invasion.

Rail Yard Bombing



On 27 March the CCS finally agreed Eisenhower would "control" strategic air forces in mid-April. Eisenhower formed an "advisory committee of nine offices, but the "issue, however, was not settled. Now target lists were not approved. Two months out, of twenty-seven targets listed only 14 were approved and only five for "unrestricted bombing". The British War Cabinet revolted to childishly demand guarantees no target would cost more than 100 civilian lives. Churchill sent it to FDR and Eisenhower. Eisenhower wrote: "I have stuck by my guns because there is no other way in which this tremendous air force can help us … to get ashore and stay there." **131** Alternatives as bombing troop concentrations and supply dumps would kill four Frenchmen for every German. Eisenhower, Leigh-Mallory and Air Chief Marshal Portal finally obtained Churchill's "reluctant approval" by promising not more than 10,000 civilians would be killed.

> Opinions … differ greatly as to its effect on German movement. The strategic air forces hold that it was the attack on the bridges and not the railway bombings which wrecked the German supply plan. Even the German commanders … (who believed the) air attacks were ruinous …

disagreed as to which were the most successful. As to the general effectiveness of the bombings, both tactical and strategic, there can be no doubt.

By D Day some 76,200 tons of bombs had been dropped on rail centers (71,000), bridges (4,400), and open lines (800). The bridges were down the length of the Seine from Rouen to Mantes-Gassicourt before D Day … all routes over the Seine north of Paris were closed … for the following month. Railway traffic dropped … (with 100 January-February 1944) 69 to 38 (May to Juned), and by mid-July … to 23 … (without adverse) sentiment …

Bomber Command **132-133** dropped more tons than the Eighth. Eisenhower later wrote: "The fate of the Continent depended upon (our) ability … to seize … and to maintain a foothold against … (what) the enemy (throws) against us. No single factor … could be overlooked … Military events … justified the decision taken, and the French people, far from being alienated, accepted the hardships and suffering with a realism worthy of a far-sighted nation."

3. CROSSBOW – V-1 and V-2. Hitler's vengeance weapons *(Vergeltungswaffen)* program peaked as the Cross-Channel invasion approached. All feared a flurry of "V" weapons attacks on pre-invasion marshalling ports. One year before the Allies discovered the German Peenemuende missile test site on the Baltic. An August air raid forced the work underground. Then late fall 1943 disclosed 69 "ski-jump sites" as launching pads for jet-propelled bombs for mass attacks. **134** Unsuccessful bombing in December ushered in fears of daily 2,000-ton bomb raids (equal to 500 bombers). The nightmare was an unlikely destruction of assembling invasion fleets that would "prejudice" - not "preclude" -invasion. At a minimum, it threatened the population to begin in December. By late March, SHAEFE concluded the German "ski site" launch pads were a small hazard. In mid-April the air forces claimed 65 (of 96) damaged, but **135** British Chiefs remained apprehensive of the sites to claim them a top priority. From August 1943 to then, 32,000 sorties dropped 31,000 bomb tons. In March and April 1944, 22% of tactical and 13% of strategic bomb loads were on the "ski sites". By D-Day, 86 of 97 buzz bomb and 2 of 7 rocket sites were "neutralized". The V-weapon attacks began in full one week after D-Day. This "official" history does not fully record the cost and scope of the air effort required.

4. Effect of the Air Program. As Eisenhower sought approval of railway bombing, the oil bombing plan began in April with "some results" by D Day. Bridge busting was more successful; less costly than predicted and was "pressed". When rail bombing began it effectively hinder German counter moves **136** to the invasion. The combination "reduced almost to zero the enemy's ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance over the U.K. marshaling area or to launch any effective aerial countermeasures against the invasion forces." Allied air forces had air superiority on D-Day.**137**

D. Chapter 5: Ninth Air Force; Craven & Cate Army Air Forces WWII, Vol III

The second U.S. air force was the Ninth Air Force with "tactical" planes to support Army ground operations. It was created in just seven months! The 1942 VIII Air Support Command become the tactical air force. Gen Hansell, Jr. in July 1943 drafted for COSSAC a detailed, accurate build-up for Gen Brereton to command. Most staff arrived from late September to November. ***107*** Brereton took command 16 October. The Ninth began with little more than a name. Eighth Air Force split off its VIII Air Support Command and Tactical Air Service Area Command to the Ninth as most crew came from Eighth Air Force, but then another 170,000 arrived from the U.S.

1. Organization and Build-up. It was challenging. The Ninth "found itself in the position of a vassal owing homage to two suzerains who had conflicting conceptions of their authority." Eaker's USAFUK became USSTAF under Gen Spaatz on 20 January 1944 and Spaatz quickly quarreled with British Leigh-Mallory over training. Spaatz quickly announced 24 **108** February that he, the Commanding General of USSTAF exercised over administrative and training of the Ninth Air Force, but Gen Bereton wanted "his Ninth Air Force" to be independent of USSTAF and AEAF. It was not and British Gen Leigh-Mallory found he was a powerless Allied tactical air forces commander! He "commanded" without any power to command power. But Gen Spaatz and Gen Knerr, deputy for administration, strongly opposed all Ninth moves for autonomy by not delegating the Ninth control over its own logistics. **109** Gen Arnold did not back the Ninth's "independence as a "tiff" brewed between the Ninth Air Force and AEAF. Only in April 1944 were lines of authority settled. After the D-Day assault, U.S. and U.K. tactical air forces reported to the AEAF under Leigh-Mallory. Col Anderson was the IX Bomber Command medium bomber commander 110-11 flying B-26 mediums and A-20 attack bombers. Before February it only had 4 medium bomber groups – then 8 medium and 3 attack bomber groups with 21,000 men by D-Day.

The IX Fighter Command, a bit more complicated, was headed by the famous Brig. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada with an outstanding fighter command reputation who came from Egypt.[5] **112** The build-up was frustrated by competition between the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces for fighter groups. Late 1943 plans had 36 fighter groups split 15 for the Eighth and 21 for the Ninth. Three types, P-38, P-47, and P-51 were available, but the Ninth had the best - P-51's to end with 36,000 men and 1,500 aircraft.

IX Troop Carrier Command was the slowest to full strength as its groups did not arrive until March 1944. Gen **113** Giles troop carrier Mediterranean command took charge 16 October with three wings of 14 groups as Gen Williams succeeded Giles with more Mediterranean crews so in June 1944 Troop Carrier Command (C-47's) had 30,000 men. Ninth Air Force uniquely had an IX Air Defense Command intended to free "attack" fighter-bombers to "attack". It defended Allied facilities with 1,400 to 5,200 men. **114-115-116-117-118-119-120**

AAF Distribution ETO			
	Eighth Air Force		**Ninth Air Force**
7	P-51 groups	13	P-47 groups
4	P-38 groups	3	P-38 groups
4	P-47 groups	2	P-51 groups
15		18	

2. Early Operations. Before April 1944, Ninth AF flew POINTBLANK and CROSSBOW missions on German airfields and coast installations and escorted heavy bombers. V-weapons produced high-priority targets. It began with four B-26 groups, but an ill-fated low-level attack on Ijmuiden, the Netherlands, in May, sent its planes back to the 12,000 to 15,000 levels but with a much better impression of their performance. **121** B-26 Marauders struck airfields and industry with CROSSBOW targets second. Striking German airdromes in France and Low Countries it minimally hampered the GAF. The hope was medium bombers would divert German fighters from the heavy bombers; they did not as their targets, *Luftwaffe* airfields, rarely had planes. Attempts to German fighters to the mediums failed. There were some satisfactory results as on 3 November with 72

[5] The details of who and want were formed are omitted.

Marauder B-26's hit the St.-André-de-l'Eure field and 13 December saw 199 planes bomb Amsterdam-Schiphol airdrome causing severe damage. But attrition of German forces was slight. **122**. December brought attacks on V-sites. Commander Leigh-Mallory felt them "ineffectual", but Spaatz wrote medium attacks on airdromes had to be coordinated with Eighth Air Force bombing.

Frankly, Spaatz disliked Leigh-Mallory which "created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between the two headquarters." Yet, Ninth's fighters were "rock stars" with their new P-51 Mustangs in November. On 1 December 28 P-51's made swept northwest France. On 5 December they flew their first escort. On 13 December they flew with B-17's 490 miles to Kiel and back – the longest fighter mission yet flown. It presaged the defeat of the GAF over Germany. When **123** jettisonable fuel tanks were added, the P-51 became the outstanding long-range escort fighter … (it) most P-51's went to the Eighth Air Force."

Fighter Groups by Date of Activation					
1	358th (P-47), 3 Feb.	*7*	*405th (P-47),11 Apr.*	13	404th (P-47), 1 May
2	362d (P-47), 8 Feb.	*8*	*371st (P-47), 12 Apr.*	14	36th (P-47), 8 May
3	365th (P-47), 22 Feb.	*9*	*48th (P-47), 20 Apr.*	15	373d (P-47), 8 May
4	363d (P-51), 22 Feb.	*10*	*474th (P-38), 25 Apr.*	16	406th (P-47), 9 May
5	366th (P-47), 14 Mar.	*11*	*50th (P-47), 1 May*	17	367th (P-38), 9 May
6	368th (P-47), 14 Mar.	*12*	*370th (P-38), 1 May*		

With only five groups (4 four mediums, 1 fighter) Ninth Air Force began on a small scale, but with a sharp uptick in February. In three months, Ninth bomber and fighter groups were operational as the IX Bomber Command added four more medium, three light A-20 groups and another 17 fighter groups plus a pathfinder squadron for blind-bombing. On 21 February pathfinders led B-26's to Holland. Then 9 February began the long campaign of railroad yard attacks per the Transportation Plan. In February, B-26's flew 2,328 sorties, with over 3,300 tons of bombs and losing 20 planes. In March the **124** major IX Bomber ta were Transportation Plan targets of the Germany railroads.

Still, bomber escort missions occupied most Ninth forces with 1,778 February sorties with Big Week. On 4 March, the fighters flew all the way to Berlin and over 4,600 sorties in March as bomber escort. In April fighters strafed and bombed as the Ninth became a "full-fledged" tactical air force learning the fighter bomber trade. On 26 March, 240 fighters hit marshalling yards and CROSSBOW targets dropping 102 bomb tons **125** in March, 112 tons in April and photographed 160 miles of French coast.

3. Logistical Planning. For D-Day the Ninth had forged combat veterans (flying from the U.K.) to be a mobile force with cut back depots and "stuff". Logistical officer, Gen Knerr, forced rear areas into "mobility". **126** The Ninth had its own ordnance depot, but 127 supply problems abounded.

Planned Build-Up of Support Troops	
D plus 3-	elements for the operation of two refueling and rearming strips.
D plus 8-	elements for the operation of the refueling system* for 9 fighter squadrons, 5 fighter-bomber squadrons, and 1 fighter-reconnaissance squadron.
D plus 14	elements for the operation on the continent of one fighter-reconnaissance, 12 fighter-bomber, and 12 fighter squadrons.
D plus 24	elements for the operation of 37 squadrons.
D plus 40	elements for the operation of 58 squadrons.

The Eighth strategic bombers had a higher fighter planes priority, but fighter aircraft flooded the ETO. May 1944 brought a shortage of 75-gallon jettisonable fuel tanks, but on D-day **t**he Ninth had full strength of 500 planes and 2,700 gliders. The worst problem was bombers did not always have appropriate bombs! **128**The Ninth had its own modification and assembly depots with 500 new planes in April and 2,000 gliders before D-Day! Repair depots handled B-26's, P-47's, P-51's, P-38's, C-47's, and gliders. 129 By D-day the Ninth was completely self-sufficient. 130

For D-day, 90,000 gallons of aviation fuel were pre-stocked as combat groups, airdrome squadrons, and service teams left for embarkation ports. Its service command had 3,000 replacements waiting -- grim necessities of war. French invasion airfields construction with ng with two emergency landing strips (rough graded 2,000 feet long for belly landings). By D+8 there were five advanced landing grounds with 35 planned by D+40 – **131** for fighters. bomber and troop carrier aircraft needed longer airfields. Air engineers prepared fields, as service squadrons began the next set. Specialty beach squadrons began service operations on D-day while engineer brigades opened beach dumps receiving, sorting, and distributing. Initial Air Corps units had ten-day pack-up kits for airdrome squadrons. Then service teams n brought 30-day supplies. **132** Assuming rapid advances, long-term beach supply and semi-permanent supply and service depots were built. Discussed elsewhere as the cross-Channel pipeline. **133**

2. Training. The authors state a basic truism: "The contributions of the Ninth Air Force to the landings in Normandy and … defeat of the German armies … (required) intensive training … The high degree of readiness … on D-day attested to the energy and speed with which most of them had carried out their training assignments." *(Comment: The above highlights this effort. Looking back t0 TORCH landings brings home the unparalleled advancements made between November 1942 and June 1944. To those, including official historians, who argue the cross-Channel Invasion should have launched in 1943, the "official" histories demolish such thoughts as this history reveals the momentous task involved to prove winning battles was only one-half of the war!)* 134, 135, 136. 137.

E. _Davis, COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE April 1 – 15 , 1944

1. Events.

1 April: Eighth Air Force—mistakenly bombs Swiss Schaffhausen. One B-24 interned.
2 April: Fifteenth Air Force—reaches strength of 16 heavy bomber groups.
5 April: USSTAF—Gen Spaatz tells Arnold Eighth fighters will "strafe anything that moves in Germany."
9 April: Eighth Air Force—three B-17s and seven B-24s interned in Sweden.
10 April: Soviets take Odessa. 11 April: Eighth Air Force—nine B-17s interned in Sweden.
13 April: Eighth Air Force—10 B-17s and three B-24s interned in Switzerland.
14 April: Bomber Command and Eighth Air Force come under General Eisenhower's "direction."

In April agreed plans "blew up". The British "did not give Eisenhower unquestioned control of the strategic air forces." Eisenhower balked. "On 7 April … the combined chiefs agreed that the strategic air forces would operate under the supreme commander's 'direction' …" just **227** **228** six weeks before the invasion. Agreements were vague, but all gave "plentiful support for the invasion and … the bomber offensive against Germany without letup."

2. The Dispute over Strategic Targeting. Unlike Harris, Spaatz never questioned Eisenhower's authority. Yet, he differed, sharply, with Leigh-Mallory and others on timing, direction, and diversion of his effort diverted. Spaatz insisted all plans had to obtain **"air parity over the invasion area"** and his strategic needed to begin by D+60! He felt his USSTAF had forces to both the invasion and strategic bombing. He resisted anything that slowed his costly strategic momentum he had gained, including his hope to defeat Germany with air power, alone.

Harris insisted he was incapable of "precision" bombing –only "carpet bombing!" Halting strategic bombing for the invasion:

> … would undo everything achieved … (as) Germany … (would have) uninterrupted (production) period just before the invasion. **Any subordination of Bomber Command … might actually have a detrimental effect on Overlord.**"
>
> Two events … undercut Harris's contentions. His winter bombing campaign … (was) increasingly … costly (due to) interception by the German night-fighter force … (which was) dominant. Bomber Command … could no longer sustain the … campaign … (as) **the first three months of 1944 Bomber Command lost 796 aircraft** … compared with 348 … 1943 **… Portal ordered … night precision bombing … (of) rail marshaling yards … (for) outstanding results, unequivocally demonstrating the abilities of Harris's units to pulverize the Overlord targets**! **229**

3. The Oil Plan Revived. Since 1942, eliminating Ploesti was the first step before **244** hitting synthetic oil. Spaatz fought the British who wanted control of Fifteenth AAF in Italy. On 17 February Portal ordered bombing of "… objectives in the Balkans …" and then Hungarian political targets to the Fifteenth's strikes but refused to target Ploesti. Ploesti success gave Spaatz a "high trump card" as he adamantly pressed Ploesti, and Portal "adamantly resisted it."

On 5 April Fifteenth AAF "accidentally hit Ploesti oil yards, not rail yards. Craven and Cate state he began "surreptitiously aiming for transportation targets, but knocking out the Astra group refineries nearby, instead. Then 15 and 26 April had more Ploesti "incidental" damage as the Germans increased defenses by oil production dropped from 186,000 tons (March) to 40,000 tons (June) as "the Fifteenth's clandestine oil offensive set the stage for attacks on the synthetic plants."

4. CROSSBOW Frustrations. Churchill delayed the French transport plan when informed it might ill 80,000 to 160,000 French and Belgian civilians. Reacting to shelling the French Fleet at Casablanca, Churchill stalled all demanding no more than 150 injuries per attack! His resistance lost to the emergency of V-1 Crossbow sites mid-April. **246** **Suddenly,** "Crossbow" had second priority after yards and then first priority over destroying the Luftwaffe – **"the final straw for Spaatz."** Teddar issue orders solely on British domestic politics!

5. Bomber Offensive (Note Text Jumps to Page 331). In April Bomber Command had 614 Lancasters, 353 Halifaxes, 58 Stirling's and 72 Mosquitoes and 11 major raids: five French, three German, three in both and two deep raids (Schweinfurt and Friedrichshafen) losing 23 and 19 bombers (8%). Munich (24 April) and Brunswick (22 April) lost 9 of 255 and 3 of 256 planes (2.3%). Shallow strikes hit Aachen (11 April) and Essen (26 April) losing 14 (1.7 %), but Karlsrühe (24 April) and Düsseldorf (22 April) lost 50 (4.3%). Whenever Bomber Command made twin strikes, the Germans defended just one. Harris' No. 5 Group and Pathfinder **331** **332** force (PFF) struck 13 transport targets:

11 French, one Belgium and one Germany, but killed 482 civilians in Ghent. Bomber Command cut up French rails, forcing Germans to halt civilian transport.

April in Italy had Fifteenth Air Force on Balkan missions at Pointblank targets. Three missions (2, 12 and 23 April) hit aircraft and ball bearings in Hungary. On 3 April the Fifteenth bombed Budapest rails and an Me-410 plant. Davis wrote it told "Hungarians that the Western Allies could punish them … before the Red Army arrived …" Ten days later bombes Budapest and Gyor, then on 17 April came Sofia marshaling yard plus targets in Italy. Ploesti was hit again on 5, 15 and 24 April to cut Ploesti production from 186,000 tons in March to 104,000 tons in April.

Eighth fielded 109 more heavy bombers a day in April than March (1,156 to 1,265) for 17 major April operations: France (4), Belgium (1) and Germany (12), but it was a difficult month. April Fools' Day had all three divisions on Germany. The 1st Division hit clouds so 275 of 440 bombers returned without attacks. The Pathfinders for 165 bombers were 100 miles to far south **333** as 17 bombed Strasbourg, France not Mannheim! Then 38 hit Schaffhausen, Switzerland killing 37, wrecking a museum and city hall that cost the U.S. an egregious 62,176,433.06 Swiss francs! April 8 and 9 April missions to central Germany and Baltic lost 34 bombers but downed 153 fighters. The second one lost 32 bombers (10 to Sweden). They kept the planes, treated crews well and swapped airmen for U.S. planes. Eighth fighters claimed 39 Germans but lost 33. Then an 11 April strike lost 64 bombers (9 to Sweden). Escorts claimed **334** 51 in the air and 65 German fighters on the ground for 16 lost.

April 13 April Schweinfurt and Augsburg cost 38 with 77 German fighters versus 9 U.S. fighters lost. Then 18 April, 729 Eighth AAF bombers hit plane production near Berlin. Here 41 bombers, without escort, 19 bombers for 20 German planes. Analysts concluded "…US bomber forces …hit several dozen scattered targets … (using) small formations … with almost no loss … (signaling) the Luftwaffe day fighter effort had weakened appreciably."

Next day 700 bombers hit aircraft plants in Kassel and central Germany losing five bombers, claiming 16 enemy for two fighters down. The Luftwaffe was losing – hoarding planes for the **335** invasion. Then British CROSSBOW fever took hold as Spaatz argued the *Luftwaffe* was not yet defeated. He finagled with Eisenhower to trade days for oil and "transportation" with "V-site" bombing. He had 824 bombers hit V-sites, 653 hit Hamm marshalling yards and two days for oil. Then 824 bombers hit V-sites, 22 April 653 bombers hit the Hamm marshalling yards; 27 April, 476 hit V-targets in France.

The Luftwaffe carefully chose its battles. On 22 April, as the 2d Division landed in the dark, German intruders infiltrated to down 19, but never again used this successful tactic even though their radar saw planes taking off and forming up --- vulnerable points since **336** fighter cover was impossible. On 24 April air industry targets in south Germany were bombed by over 700 planes; 40 bombers lost (14 interned in Switzerland) with one shot down by friendly fire. This and a 27 April raid, damaged drive gear assemblies for Panzer III, IV, and V's, and half of all their engines. It caused a 30% production drop. Fighters shot down 66 planes with another 58 on the ground to lose just 17 fighters.

On 26 April 344 bombers hit Brunswick and Hannover with five fighters lost. On 29 April Berlin was hit as the alternative target. Since, as mentioned, H2X could not find oil plants, they required very clear (and very few) days. This time, the Luftwaffe fought costing the Eighth 64 of 618 bombers with another 432 "damaged". All but one wing bombed city center. The 17 fighter groups claimed 22 losing 13 escorts. In April, the Eighth **"wrote off 420 heavy bombers!"** **337** It was an increase from 3.3% (March) to 3.6%

for bombers, fighters remained a low 1.4%. **The Eighth however lost 20.1% of all pilots (447) to all causes! A horribly high rate. But German defenders, *Luftflotte Reich* and *Luftflotte 3*, lost 34% and 24% of their fighter pilots, respectively.**

6. Mining of the Danube in April. The Danube … wends over 1,700 miles from the foothills of the Swiss Alps and Black Forest through foremost cities of central Europe and the Balkans— Augsburg, Munich, Linz, Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade—and the Rumanian-Bulgarian border before turning north and emptying into the Black Sea. It is commercially navigable from the Black Sea to Regensburg. During WWII it was a vital link in the German southeast transport system hauling 8,000,000 tons into Germany from 1942 to 1944. It began 8 April to 10 September with 1,315 mines in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. The naval mine affects the enemy's material, but his psyche as well. Captains refused to sail until lanes were swept as Germany had to create a new sweeping force. British intelligence (Ultra ?) revealed between April and July 1944, tonnage dropped 35%. **338**

With the ratio of resources expended versus results achieved, the mining of the Danube ranks as one of the most effective strategic bombing campaigns of World War II. It exploited a weak point the Germans hardly even realized they had … (and) left them scrambling to counter it and its effects. The riverine operations … demonstrated … the great leverage of strategic operations … Less than 400 sorties flown by castoff aircraft and only 1,315 mines … over a period of five months, disrupted vital communications … and cut the imports of the commodity most valuable … oil. The results … suggest that modern air forces might do well to develop a family of nonmetallic, smart naval mines for deployment in future conflicts.**339**

F. April 1 - 15, 1944: Buresh Eighth AF Bombing Logs Excel Format, xyza.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE DAILY RECORDS

				B-17's				B-24's				US Bomb Crew			Lutwaffe			P-38 & P-47 Escort				P-51 Esc0rt				Lutwaffe			US Crews		
No.	Mission	Area	Type	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	KIA	WIA	MIA	Dwn	Rep	50%	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Los	Dam	Prob	KIA	WIA	MI
Sat, 1 APR 1944			440																												
287.1	Ludwigs	Largely cancelled weather					7											230	2	0	12					13	1	19	0	0	
287.2	Ludwigs	Germ	Indus					165	12	3	42	9	12	113	1	1	0					195	2	0	2				0	0	
Wed, 5 APR 1944			67																												
288	St Pol	Fran	V-1	Failure				21	0	0	0											50	0	0	0						
289.1	Various	Germ	Air	}														332	2	0	8					2	0	2	0	0	
289.1	Various	Germ	Air	}																		124	7	0	3	96	4	120	1	0	
289.2	CARPETBAGGER French Underground FFI							17	1	0	0	0	0	10																	
Thr, 6 APR 1944			Small																												
290	Watten	Fran	V-1					12	0	0	0							27	0	0	0										
Sat, 8 APR 1944			664																												
291.1	Oldenburg	Germ	Air	59	0	0	32					0	5	0				136	5	0	3					88	3	46	0	0	
291.2	Achmer	Germ	Air	246	4	0	128					1	3	40				438	4	2	12					49	6	38	0	0	
291.3	Brunswick	Germ	Air					303	30	2	87	8	23	300	58	9	32					206	14	0	3				0	0	
292	Liege	Belg	Info	5	0	0	0																								
Sun, 9 APR 1944			565																												
293.1	Rahmel	Pol	Air	140	6	0	44					8	9	60	45	8	14	119	2	2	9					20	1	6	1	0	
293.2	Pozan	Pol	Air	136	12	0	93					0	6	120				387	4	1	2					19	0	8	2	2	
293.3	Tutow	Germ	Air					126	14	0	30	17	6	140								213	4	1					0	0	
294.1	Rouen	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0																								
294.2	CARPETBAGGER *Fr. Resis. FFI*							23	0	0	0																				
Mon, 10 APR 1944			752																												
295.1	Brussels	Belg	Air	234	1	0	99					0	4	10				51	0	0	0										
295.2	Maldagem	Belg	Air	206	1	2	19					0	0	10	0	2	1	295	1	0	4					12	0	7	0	0	
295.3	Bourge	Fran	Air					215	1	0	3	0	1	10	6	0	0					150	1	0		40	0	16	0	0	
296.1	Florennes	Belg	Air															39	0	0	0										
296.2	St. Diezer	Fran	Air															23	2	0	1					2	0	1	0	0	
296.3	Gutersloch	Germ	Air															74	1	0	0										
297.1	Lille	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0																								
297.2	*CARPETBAGGER Fr. Resis. FFI*							23	0	0	0																				
Tue, 11 APR 1944			922																												
298.1	Sorau	Germ	Air	310	19	3	190					12	13	200	12	2	3	124	0	0	0					51	5	25			
298.2	Rostock	Germ	Indus	274	33	1	153					2	9	330	34	20	19	454	7	0	16					65	0	67			
298.3	Oschersleben	Germ	Indus					243	12	1	63	5	9	122	27	2	1					241	9	0	13				0	0	
299.1	Paris	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0																								
299.2	*CARPETBAGGER Fr. Resis. FFI*							12	0	0	0																				
Wed, 12 APR 1944			455	(Estimated bomber split)																											
300	Schweinfurt	Germ	Indus	250	6	2	1	155	0	0	25	12	16	56	10	6	7	598	3	2	20	193	2	0	1	19	1	11	0	0	
Thr, 13 APR 1944			626																												
301.1	Schweinfurt	Germ	Indus	155	14	1	127					0	11	139				134	33	1	1					0	2	8			
301.2	Augsburg	Germ	Indus	207	17	2	178					3	16	170				504	2	0	5										
301.3	Lechfeld	Germ	Air	184	6	0	45					1	3	60								233	4	1	5						
302	Amsterdam	N'lnd	Info	4	0	0	0																								
SHAEF controls of air forces																															
Sat, 15 APR 1944			None																												
303	Strafing	Germ	Air															349	18	1	29	222	15	1	5	57	1	35	0	0	
	Two Week Totals			2425	119	11	1116	1315	70	6	250	78	146	1890	193	50	77	4314	86	9	122	1827	58	3	32	533	24	409	4	2	

On only three days in the first two weeks in April did Eighth AAF send out over 600 bombers (April 8, 10 and 11). Although its two weeks totals were a respectable 2,425 and 1,315 B-17 and B-24 sorties that period. Only 17 bombers were "finished off", but 190 were shot down – a significant loss. U.S. airmen claimed shooting down 193 and 533 *Luftwaffe* fighters – clearly healthy claims. U.S. crews downed were just 82 airmen. U.S. fighters flew over 6,000 missions the first two weeks of April 1944.

G. Chapter 5: Overlord Revised; Cross-Channel Attack, Harrison (1944)

Debate endangered OVERLORD continued. **172** Eisenhower cabled Marshall uncertainty hurt OVERLORD planning. On 21 March he recommended cancelling ANVIL simultaneous with OVERLORD. "The Gordian knot … was cut. OVERLORD … (had) landing craft in numbers at least adequate for the job …"

1. The Neptune Plans. The new NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan had three British authors: Montgomery, Adm Ramsay, and Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory. It was both detailed and sketchy. **173** Planning required each army to prepare "outline assault plans" to include regimental frontage, objectives, Ranger and airborne tasks, German beach targets, naval fire support, men and vehicles on the first four tides, landing craft identified, lists by types and number of men and vehicles for each, operations and build-up priorities from D + 1 to + 14, and airfield construction programs! The First U.S. Army 25 Feb Plan and Second British Army 20 Mar plan became the OVERLORD ground force plan. Naval and air commanders also published plans. The naval plan had exhaustive detail on many levels. Outline plans for armies, corps, and naval task forces "were the framework for lower echelon plans," of "army, corps, and task force plans." which were generally (though not always) issued in final form as field or operation orders."

Harrison does not detail any plan but sought to: "… distill out of the scores of relevant documents-plans, memoranda, minutes of meetings, amendments, and similar sources-the salient points of the tactical plan at about army level … (for) principal problems that arose … Detailed plans of divisions and lower units will be found in appropriate places in the narrative of operations." Yet. for all of the criticism of COSSAC's plan, an "Google" search revealed many of the actual detailed OVERLORD plans that were frankly pathetic! Reading them is revealing -- they truly state very little. There was little substance. Instead, the plans were "load sheet" lists of units by waves and days of delivery – a freight manifest.

There were no assault plans as "Unit "X does a, b and c to obtain this position by this time." Instead, plans consisted of "loading plans" for "X" number of units to arrive at point "Y" with a general hope of reaching point "Z". There were no phase lines, daily advance plans, objectives, or schemes of maneuver. Each division had boundaries to simply "advance" there. There were no comprehensive directions beyond "advance" to objectives. OVERLORD defined sectors without combat plans other than setting phase lines but using "phase lines" was discouraged. Probable commanders were unwilling to set geographic objectives with deadlines to capture. Thus, when commanders reported their forces were progressing "as expected" it was truthful since "expected" remained undefined![6]

When histories describe OVERLORD plans there were no "plans" they identify! It begs the question: what planning consumed so much time-effort? "Planning" meant discussions and meetings.

2. The Enemy. Planning assumed German dispositions would not change, yet it was clear by February German defenses were **[174]** strengthening. Axis French forces increased from 40 to 53 divisions in February – a steady 12 offensive divisions: the Allied maximum to tackle. "In May it seemed unlikely … more divisions would be moved … in the first few months of OVERLORD …" The test was in "first-class divisions" for a mobile reserve. Over 50% of German divisions fixed fortress troops. Maps portray a vast number of German divisions, but German static defense forces were very "static" -- not trained or equipped to fight as normal units. Allies guessed "static divisions would resist only so long as

[6] See Naval History and Heritage site, Operation Neptune, The Invasion of Normandy, CHAPTER II, PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR CROSS-CHANNEL (OVERLORD) OPERATIONS: All 14 pages of Operation Neptune are available at: //cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/1216/rec/8.

they could fire from protected positions with minimum risk to themselves." They improvements were limited to "attack divisions which were understrength and underequipped … (The) enemy … could not **[175]** increase the total offensive striking power of his troops in France …" German "all-out defense of the coastline … (meant) rather a short stubborn stand in the fortified coastal zone of long enough … (so) attack divisions in immediate tactical reserve … (could) launch holding counterattacks ... (which gave) time for the massing of armored reserves for a full-scale counterattack designed to drive the Allies back into the sea." Thus, "the location and quality of reserves were the critical factors …" The "reserves" were 10 panzer and panzer grenadier divisions and 14-17 attack infantry or parachute divisions, of which 6 were first quality. D+7 was assumed the Germans could concentrate 7 good divisions for a counterattack. The morning of D+4 required the Navy to land the maximum Allied forces landed and dug in.

The "Atlantic Wall" was likely not impregnable under sufficient fire. Six batteries of 24-240-mm guns were the major naval concern. One set was at Pointe du Hoe overlooking U.S. beaches and the other at Fermanville near Cherbourg. Fortunately, the latter were being cased in concrete which would prohibit them from pointing rearward at the beaches. **[176]** Planners cheered German progress! Defenders had 73 guns plus mobile artillery of 170-mm. with a range of 32,370 yards (1,760 yards/mile = 18.3 miles). Fortunately, the 8-170 mm guns were destroyed in bombing before D-Day.

On 20 February aerial photos showed new obstacles in the beach tidal flats designed to rip hulls and/or explode. The Germans laid from the high tide level working downward. By May, the last 8 feet of low tide beach was free giving three hours twice a day without obstructions. Solutions were "expensive" (*i.e.,* in demolition team deaths). **177-178** German naval defense was a miniscule with 60 E-boats with mines and torpedoes. E-boats were 50% larger, but slower, than Navy PT boats. They only attacked at night. Germany's 130 U-boats were unlikely give the Channel's shallow 200 feet depth (vs. maximum dive depths over 700 feet). "Estimates of the enemy's air strength … (were likely) drawn from a hat." This had not changed much from 1943 estimates of 1,000 to 1,800 D-Day sortie, which were

Overlord Area Map II – Cross-Channel Attack



unlikely in the first invasion stages. Allied air and navy guns made air attacks too costly. D-Day might see a 60% sortie rate, but this was unlikely. Allied superiority made sustained bombing too costly. **[179]** The GAF "had been defeated by the Combined Bomber Offensive in the early … 1944. This … was the most important ingredient … to go ahead with OVERLORD."

> The basic assumption behind all Allied estimates … was that the enemy would make his supreme effort to defeat the invasion, hoping … (for) a compromise peace despite his hopeless situation on the Russian front. The principal weakness … (was lack of) reserves in men and materiel … (that negated) a sustained defense. The … Germans would stake everything on the initial battle of the beach. The decision … (for) OVERLORD … implied an estimate that the enemy's maximum strength was probably insufficient to win the battle for the beachheads.

3. Objectives and Terrain. COSSAC's conclusions on the where and when of D-Day were never questioned. Given the Allies disagreements, it was a major achievement. Yet, the "assault phase plan that underwent drastic revision." The issued involved the topography of five regions. Understanding these assists in understanding the battles.

1. Rolling, open uplands north one-half of the Cotentin Peninsula.
2. The Bessin coastal strip from Isigny to Bayeux.
3. The flat, marshy and "water-logged" south Cotentin Peninsula (near Carentan and west over the peninsula).
4. The "Bocage" hilly wooded triangle Caen to the west coast and south to the base of Brittany.
5. Open agricultural areas south and east of Caen.

The three British **[180]** beaches were from Bessin to Caen lacked clear geographic distinctions, but south in the Bessin led to the Bocage and southeast from Caen led to fields perfect for tanks and airfields. Caen country was critical. The British would capture Bayeux and Caen on D-Day to quickly advance south and southeast for airfield sites and to protect the east flank. The primary U.S. mission was Cherbourg's vital port. COSSAC allotted only two British divisions, but Montgomery increased this to three divisions by sea and most of one airborne division to secure crossings of the Orne River. In all plans the importance of the "capture and retention" of Caen and neighboring open country was clear.

Yet, no D-Day plans exploited favorable tank terrain for a southeast thrust to Paris. Instead, the British army would push gradually south and east of Caen all the way to Falaise to swing west to Argentan-Alencon. (NOTE: "Falaise" was very far south -- off the above map. It is shown in the "OVERLORD AREA MAP". Just below the "R" in "NORMANDY.")

Securing Bessin was one U.S. one division for the key Aure River south to Bayeux and west parallel to and behind coast beaches to Isigny. There it joined the Vire River and into the Channel. The Aure lower reaches from Trevieres to Isigny were marshy flooded lands. The Aure made a coast peninsula from Port-en-Bessin to Isigny up to five miles in rolling tableland cut up in Norman bocage hedge fields. Only the coast Vierville-sur-Mer to St. Laurent was open country. This "peninsula" was the main road that tied all five invasion beaches together – it was critical to the lodgement.

The initial COSSAC plan sent the attack at Bessin-Caen straight south and southwest deep into the Bocage during the first week to then break out northwest the Cotentin Peninsula to capture Cherbourg (*e.g.,* a "U" turns into the Cotentin). "The low marshy bottom lands of the Douve River **[181]** nearly

across the base of the peninsula made it difficult." In actually completely impossible. **No one realized the danger of Bocage hedgerows – it was completely ignored and/or simply missed. The bocage more than the Germans, made Normandy unbearable.**

The Germans turned the Cotentin Peninsula (Carentan and south) into flooded **"almost continuous swamplands were traversed by only three main roads … (were) easily defended moats across about five-sixths of the (lower) peninsula.** The only dry corridor is on the west coast-a strip 5,000 to 6,000 yards wide between St. Lô-d'Ourville and St. Sauveur de Pierre-Pont, which could easily be held by a small enemy force." The f swamp and bocage were terrifying or infuriating, but deadly to all. **The COSSAC plan of divisions marching south from Caen, making a wide U-turn up the Cotentin Peninsula to capture Cherbourg was fanciful on its face, yet no one seriously objected at the QUADRANT Quebec Conference. The "official" histories" do not explain how was such an impossibility was ignored for so long?** Harrison wrote:

Final Overlord Plan Map III – Cross-Channel Attack



> The overriding importance of Cherbourg … led to … a simultaneous assault in the peninsula itself … north of the Douve (River) line. Such … became practicable only with the decision to employ five divisions … (but this) had serious disadvantages … (because behind Utah Beach was) a flooded coastal strip … about two miles wide … (And only four) narrow causeways provided the only exits from the beach … Relatively small German forces could hold these causeways … (to) defeat the landing … The proposed solution … (was) an airborne division … dropped … (near) Ste. Mère-Eglise … (for) holding the causeways … (open). The only previous Allied experience with large-scale airborne operations, in Sicily … (was not a) success … More important … the same water barrier which barred the Cotentin from attack from the south could also be … a wedge between the Allied bridgeheads … (so) the enemy might defeat the landings in detail …

This only covered the visible flooding immediately behind UTAH Beach, not the massive, flooded lands behind OMAHA Beach or across 30 some miles of the Cotentin Peninsula. "The risk was assumed in order to rapidly capture the Cherbourg port." *(Comment: Yet the "risk" described was the flooded area behind UTAH Beach).* First U.S. Army was to assault on both sides of the Vire estuary with one regiment of VII Corps at UTAH and two regiments of V Corps at OMAHA. First **182** Army's main task was "to capture Cherbourg as quickly as possible." The UTAH beach exits would be held by one airborne division that later became two airborne divisions.

4. Airborne Planning and the Lodgement. Gen Morgan had two airborne divisions, but only 632 transport planes. He planned on paratroops near Caen but lacked planes. Harrison suggests the Chiefs were doubtful about paratroops. The Dieppe disaster lowered paratroop importance due to weather limits. D-day could not wait for good flying weather. While new navigation aids improved performance, Sicily action reports warned against "undue dependence" on paratroops. Fortunately, Eisenhower and Marshall decided the Sicily error was in dispersing not concentrating, airborne. Marshall stated: **[183]** "The value of airborne forces … would be immense …to seize quickly and control ports …" Gen Ridgway (82nd airborne) tried to increase double the airborne forces so they would land, stay and fight as another division. Thus, the 82nd and 101st Airborne joined OVERLORD with four, not three, regiments, fighting an infantry and did not disappoint. But a need arose for British paratroops on east border to take the Orne River bridge. Eisenhower requested two airborne divisions for D-day and a third on D+1. The British claimed lack of air crews. **[184 185]** February plans had C-47 planes for 1 2/3rd airborne divisions, but two were needed for Utah Beach.

A brief diversion covers a bold, little-known, dangerous scheme by Gen Arnold for an "airborne bridgehead" 85 miles southeast of the landing beaches at Evreux-Dreux, France. He would threaten the Germans with troops close to the Seine River in an "air bridgehead" to close Seine River barge traffic and threaten Paris (60 miles southeast). Putting airborne forces 80 miles behind enemy lines suggests a naivety regarding German strengths and a poor reflection Arnold's reputation. Yet, Gen Marshall agreed -- it was "a true vertical envelopment involving a major strategic threat". It negated the "it's had never been done before" excuse to send the plan to Eisenhower with officers to defend it. Wisely, Eisenhower rejected the idea of his "superiors" in a diplomatic fashion. Paratroopers created "vertical envelopments" Eisenhower noted but only had their two feet to advance. On the ground they were slow and without armor. The Anzio, Italy drops found the Germans unperturbed by an enemy in their rear areas. Anzio failed against 19 German divisions; Normandy faced 60 enemy divisions!

Boccage Headgerows Normandy

Then two airborne divisions plan was criticized. Leigh-Mallory refused to endorse daylight glider landings. Then in late May, the German *91st Division* occupied the airborne drop area, so landing zones were scrunched together. The 101st nearer Utah beaches. The 82nd on the key north south Merderet River intending to drive west to cut the base of the peninsula. Gen Leigh-Mallory predicted 50% casualties. Eisenhower said great risks were accepted. **[186]**

After VII Corps (Utah) and V Corps (Omaha) Corps secured both sides the Vire River (*i.e.,* Isigny to Carentan), they would merge the lowlands for one front line facing south at Omaha and west from Carentan to St. Mere Eglise – far too optimistic. Isigny had the lowest elevation, 12 miles west of Omaha –– a three hour forced march! (*See* Final OVERLORD Plan Map). If assault plans were conservative, post-assault plans were too ambitious. V Corps would strike south from Omaha Beach to outflank on the east side of the river lowlands south of the airborne landings behind Utah Beach. The plan intended to force a German withdrawal of their west flank (Cotentin) river areas. Instead, the Germans snatched the advantage of driving between two U.S. corps landing east t Omaha and west at Utah!

D-Day plans were to snare the high tableland along Omaha Beach that rose 75 to 150 above the sea to a plateau. Southward the plateau plunged down to sea level of the west flowing Aure River to the Insigny marsh. As Omaha and Utah forces met near Insigny area, VII Corps would simultaneously attack 20 miles north up the Cotentin Peninsula headed to the medium sized port of Cherbourg while also pushing west to cut the base of Cotentin Peninsula. In the process it to skirt the massive, flooded Marquesas' Swamp that consumed much of the base to be cut, but which also enhanced the Allied defenses. Cutting the Cotentin Peninsula, the forces would attack north up the Cotentin Peninsula to invest the Port of Cherbourg to be captured by D + 15. **[187]** It was quite ambitious!

Simultaneously, OMAHA Beach U.S. forces with British forces east on the coast north of Caen, would attack south to the boundary of the Lessay-Périers-St. Lô east-west road. Here VII Corps would expand to three corps abreast pushing south to St. Lô, west across the entire Cotentin Peninsula and north all the way to Cherbourg. When Third Army was activated in two months, the First and Third Armies (then under Bradley's First U.S. Army Group) would all face south attacking that direction to gain access to the massive Brittany Peninsula at Constance. Once Brittany was attacked west, the Allied forces would continue south toward the Loire River and east toward the Seine River and Paris. This was the OVERLORD Lodgement Area to be completed by D+90 days. OVERLORD ended; but there were no viable post-OVERLORD plans!

5. The Selection of D-Day. The invasion date would launch on the first acceptable tide and weather date after 1 June 1944. H-Hour was set by the conjunction of daylight and low tides. The Allies could not hide their massive fleet from German radar or *Kriegsman* craft. Daylight was needed to spot Germany artillery defenses and Allied bombardment. **[188]** Could the Allies win an artillery duel in daylight? The assault required a dawn low tide for darkness to hide the armada's approach, but bombing and naval required daylight with a massive fire 45-minute artillery pummeling. Soldiers had to traverse 300 yards (1/5th mile) of exposed tidal sand to reach the dry beach. An incoming tide meant landing craft would not be stranded on the beach. But **189** low tide times greatly varied between beaches. Third, were the German steel beach obstacles intended to hole landing craft. There were none at the low tide level. The goal was to 3 hours before high tide (1 after low tide).

It also had to be first light. Tide and dawn conditions came over three days every two weeks. But parachute drops required a bright moon – just once each month! Thus, came June 5, 6 and 7, 1944!

6. Assault Forces and Fire Support. Each of the five assault divisions had a separate naval task force to transport and protect them. Force U (Utah) carried the 4th ID to Utah, Force O (OMAHA) the 1st ID at Omaha and Force B the 29th ID as the first follow-up for OMAHA. U.S. Adm Kirk led the U.S. Western Naval Task Force and British Adm Vian the three British forces in the Eastern Naval Task Force. Transport ships carried soldiers to the loading area with huge 30-man LCA's and LCVP's hanging from davits. It was a lengthy process as loaded craft cast off to circle and wait at designated areas – they circled, waited, and waited. There was no surprise or subtlety. The plan landed soldiers in waves. Ramp down, run off, ramp up and retract. Next wave … They soldiers had no maneuver room. Straight ahead. "Batter a way through in the shortest time." **[190]** It was a brutal frontal assault.

> In the end, little reliance was placed on probing for weakness … (or even) the advantage of tactical surprise. Using smoke … also confused the assault troops and naval fire. (It was simply creating a) "weight behind the initial attack … (to) crumble enemy defenses … (and) carry the assaulting troops … inland so that follow-up troops could be put ashore behind them to …

> exploit the beachhead. The double requirement … (to) knock out enemy fortifications and push rapidly inland required … striking power and mobility … The assault division would go in on a broad front and move fast … (and) strong enough … to hold a beachhead maintenance line. Its task … finished and (then) exploitation would be … normal infantry divisions of the follow-up.

[191] Infantry divisions were rearranged from platoons and companies to assault teams armed with "special equipment". Assault sections had 29 men and one officer (one LCVP load). A platoon was two rifle and one heavy weapons squad grouped into teams for: rifle; wire-cutting; a bazooka; flame-throwing; BAR - heavy machine gun; 60- or 81-mm. mortar and a demolition team. A tank battalion supported each regiment launched at the shore or "swimming" in from 6,000 yards (4 miles). Tanks gave close infantry support by firing into the German gun openings, cut wire, explode obstacle and using dozer blades to clear paths and roads. Tanks were to fire from the water as demolition teams blew gaps in the wires and obstacles. **[192]** Later brought engineers for minefields and artillery. Three hours after H-hour the forces were to move inland to new battle areas.

Mr. Harrison wrote that U.S. Navy fire support suffered on D-Day. Adm King was notoriously 'stingy" supporting his Atlantic navy. But the U.S. Navy "bristled" at the Royal Navy wasting its huge "Home Fleet anchored at Scapa Flow against no German threat. It seems both navies short-changed Normandy. The task of smashing … beach defenses … by naval fire support and air bombardment," was unwanted.

> … (U.S. Navy pessimism) about what fire support could accomplish was never entirely dissipated. A study … (found destroying) fifteen enemy coastal batteries … (required) twenty-three battleships or cruisers. The drenching of … beaches (meant) twenty cruisers and one hundred destroyers … (Ships) allotted (were) completely inadequate … COSSAC's naval staff estimated … medium and heavy coastal batteries … (could be neutralized, but not) beach defenses … Adm Ramsay … (stated it was only) effective against open emplacements …

The Dieppe Raid proved the need for strong fire support, but the British assigned a pathetic force of one battleship, one monitor, seven cruisers, and sixteen destroyers **[193]** for the First U.S. Army. Adm Ramsey said the U.S. Navy would be responsible. Apparently, the U.S. Navy hustled warships to England. For D-Day Force O (OMAHA) had: 2 battleships, 3 light cruisers and 12 destroyers; Force U (UTAH) had a battleship and a monitor, 5 heavy and light cruisers, and 8 destroyers, and one Dutch gunboat. There was a reserve of 2 cruisers and 17 destroyers to cover damaged or out of ammunition ships. **The intent was to "neutralize", not destroy, emplacements. It meant "stunning" the defenders.**

Starting with enemy batteries, air and sea attacks would "crescendo". Next were beach defenses and coastal batteries not "hardened" against artillery. Last, the navies would support land advances to a depth of about 12 miles. The project began months before as air forces attacked existing batteries that were being "hardened" with concrete. Two factors militated: not alerting the enemy to the obvious -- an invasion was coming and more important targets. The former meant bombing two batteries not in OVERLORD to everyone there. Only 10% of all bombs were focused on this. **[194]**

Below is Appendix E of the history intended to document the complexity, which it does. However, there were only seven plans in February, five in March and seven in April 1944.

Appendix E: Chronology Main Planning Papers from 1 January 1944			
	Date	Hq.	Paper

1	31-Jan	FUSA	Planning Directive for OVERLORD
2	1-Feb	Jt. Commanders	NEPTUNE, Initial Joint Plan
3	4-Feb	Second Army (Br)	Outline Plan
4	10-Feb	TF 122, FUSA	Joint Agreement for Amphibious Operations
5	12-Feb	V Corps	Preliminary 'OVERLORD' Plan
6	25-Feb	FUSA	Operations Plan NEPTUNE
7	28-Feb	V Corps	Planning Guide, Operation "OVERLORD"
8	28-Feb	ANCXF	Operation "NEPTUNE"--Naval Plan
9	7-Mar	21 AGP	Directive to FUSAG
10	10-Mar	SHAEF	Directive to 21 A Gp, AEAF, ANCFX
11	20-Mar	Second Army, 83	Joint Plan Group (2d TAF)
12	26-Mar	V Corps	NEPTUNE Plan
13	27-Mar	VII Corps	Plan of Operation, NEPTUNE
14	8-Apr	21 A GP, ANCXF	NEPTUNE Joint Fire Plan
15	10-Apr	ANCXF	Operation NEPTUNE-Naval Orders (ON)
16	15-Apr	AEAF	Operation NEPTUNE-Overall Air Plan
17	16-Apr	1st Div	Field Order No. 35
18	21-Apr	WNTF	Operation Plan No. 24 (ONWEST 2)
19	24-Apr	War Office	Movement Plan
20	28-Apr	21 AGP	Amended Directive to FUSAG
21	1-May	ANCXF	Amendment No. 1 to ON
22	2-May	Ninth AF	IX Tactical Air Command Plan Oper. NEPTUNE
23	6-May	82d Abn Div	Field Order No. 6
24	8-May	FUSAG, 9th AF,	Joint Operations Plan, U.S. Forces Ops OVERLORD (Rev)
25	9-May	VII Corps	Field Order No. 1
26	12-May	4th Div	Field Order No. 1
27	15-May	Assault Force U	Operation Order No. 3-44 (ON-WEST/U-3)
28	18-May	V Corps	Letter of Instruction, Amending NEPTUNE Plan
29	18-May	101st Abn Div	Field Order No. 1
30	20-May	Assault Force O	Operation Order No. BB-44 (ON-WEST/O)
31	27-May	FUSA	Revision No. 2 to Annex 12 (Fire Support)
32	28-May	82d Abn Div	Revision of Field Order No. 6
33	28-May	VII Corps	Field Order No. 1 (Corrected Copy)

H. Chapter 6: Preliminary Operations: Cross-Channel Attack, Gordon A. Harrison xyza 16-30 Apr 1944

1. <u>The French Resistance.</u> Harrison states the French underground army <u>was about 200,000 men who after Normandy impressed Allied leaders with their contributions</u>. It was true in Brittany, Paris, and South France -- less so in Normandy. Patton's Third Army found minimal aid in the mixed French-German heritage in the east France Alsace Lorraine area, but "official" histories reveal little of French Resistance aid in Normandy. Normans were "aloof", independent where south France resistance blossomed under Vichy Regime permissiveness. Normandy's small cells paled to other areas in France.

> … (The) northern zone had six (independent) groups; the south had three. Only … the communist Front National …extended control … other groups … (had) no co-ordination …

> The chief impetus … (was) General Charles de Gaulle's headquarters in London … **198**] Contacts between de Gaulle and the native Resistance were established through agents supplied by the British … (that formed) a National Committee … on 27 May 1943 … under … Georges Bidault …
>
> Much of the success … was illusory … (The) Gestapo … (struck) in June 1943 with wholesale arrests … (and the) leadership … was decimated Resistance groups … suffered heavy losses.
>
> … (Though) reorganization began at once … (it was then) controlled regionally …
>
> (Both) the BCRA and … (the British) SOE (promoted) sabotage. The SOE … (worked) through agents in the field, the goal … (to make) French Resistance into a strategic weapon … **[200]**

This was independent of underground groups who aided downed pilots to return via Spain, which is little mentioned in official histories. **[201] [202] [203]** In sabotaging French rail systems, the underground was very effective.

> … Directed by SOE/SO headquarters, railway sabotage was greatly accelerated in 1944 … Damage done … compared favorably with that inflicted from the air … In the first three months of 1944 the underground sabotaged 808 locomotives … (vs.) 387 damaged by air attack … (In) April and May, air attacks … (damaged) 1,437 locomotives (vs.) 292 … by saboteurs. Between June 1943 and May 1944, a total of 1,822 locomotives were damaged, 200 passenger cars destroyed, 1,500 cars damaged, 2,500 freight cars destroyed and 8,000 damaged. **[204]**

SOE/SO headquarters focused on rail sabotage. The Germans closed areas within 30 miles of the Channel coast. Strangers were arrested. Outside of this area, Resistance hit rails leading into the banned area. The rail plan (Plan Vert) and road demolition (Plan Tortue) were approved by SHAEF. "Tortue" blocked roads. In May SOE/SO headquarters reported 571 rail targets and 30 road cuts were ready. The Resistance promoted non-cooperation by railroad unions and management hoping for 8 to 10 days of rail complications after the landings. British Broadcasting alerted resistance teams with code messages the 1st, 2d, 15th, and 16th of each month and sent a confirming message "B." **205** Chaos in activating all sabotage at one time resulted. But post-D-Day Resistance rail-cutting was extraordinarily effective with 486 rail cuts in June. On D+1, 26 trunk lines were unusable in the battle area.

Very late, the Allies formed a Special Force Headquarters for Resistance with the FFI (Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur) under French armor Gen. Joseph Pierre Koenig. He formed a tripartite staff (French, U.S., British) in London to make the FFI as an armed component. Three -man teams ((Jedburgh's) of one French and one U.S. or British officer and **206** a radio operator landed to form communications. About 87 teams operated. U.S. and U.K. parachuted armed units. Operational Groups were 4 officers and 30 enlisted. Eleven were dropped in France as SAS groups of 2,000 assisted Brittany Resistance mainly sabotaging rails. If not measurable, the contributions were memorable "bees in the German britches".

2. The Combined Bomber Offensive ("CBO"). Harrison's comments are noteworthy. Until late 1943 a lack of clear directive for target systems and priorities saw a "loose" effort to integrate when the CCS at Casablanca ordered a "Combined Bomber Offensive" or "CBO".**[207]** The directive created separate campaigns but no action. Second, Eighth Air Force ranks were depleted to form Twelfth Air Force. The CBO began late spring 1943 desperately short of planes against [**208**] six industries of 76 "precision targets" whose cumulative destruction "will 'fatally weaken' the capacity of the German

people for armed resistance." The first obstacle was a rapidly increase of the GAF to 3,000 fighters by January 1944. "Destroying German fighter planes was a 'second to none in priority.'" [**209**] In the 4 ½ month to 15 November 1943, the Eighth AF dropped 22,667 tons of bombs, but only 1,903 tons on the aircraft industry. "The Schweinfurt ball bearing and the Messerschmitt fighter attacks proved unescorted deep penetration raids were too costly with 12% and 14% losses." **Arnold "criticized the … accomplishment during the last half of 1943" when four vital targets systems only received just 20% of the bombs**. Eaker said 62% of his force had 66% of the task accomplished. But "hit" did not mean "destroy" and "destroy" was key. Arnold said "statistics … (did not) measure of accomplishment …" but an accurate measure alluded all efforts to do so. **210**

The British Air Ministry quantified results by guessing on the reduction in German war potential at 10% with a 20% deemed fatal. Subjectively, the job was one-half done – the Germans were 50% dead – a useless fact without knowing their convalescence speed! December 1943 revealed one fact: It was not done. Bombing 75% of plane production meant nothing as production increased. One face was clear: the Allies lacked air superiority. Arnold said: "… air supremacy … (is a) turning point … What … bombers can do … once the German fighting force is rendered impotent, needs no comment. The issue hangs now on which side first falters, weakens, and loses its punishing power." "Whether victory … (was) decisive strategic bombing or preparation for OVERLORD, it was … paramount importance." **211**

"OVERLORD D Day was approaching and time to establish the prerequisite air supremacy was short." A 13 February 1944 CCS order "rejected primary, secondary, and intermediate objectives to …' depletion of the German air force . . . by all means …' It dramatically shifted air policy from … enemy industry (to) destruction of the *Luftwaffe."*

Unable to reach a doctrine agreement with the British, the U.S. **212** formed the U.S. Strategic Air Forces Europe (USSAFE) under Gen Spaatz with Gen Eaker commanding the Mediterranean Fifteenth and Gen Doolittle the Eighth Air Forces. Spaatz arrived January 1943 as the Eighth had 25 heavy bomber and 11 fighter groups and two new wings of P-38 fighters (with wing tanks) for deep escort. Long-range fighters were effective. **213** Adding belly and wing fuel tanks changed strategic bombing. By March 1944 the Eighth was so strong its targets were selected to provoke *Luftwaffe* air battles. Berlin was trigger. Heavy losses (69 bombers in one raid) still crushed German fighter numbers that peaked in February 1944 as heavy bomber casualties faded. By June, U.S. bombers bombed strategic targets at will.

OVERLORD tactical air began in April 1943 as Gen Eaker created the Air Support Command which by Fall 1943 had four commands: the medium bomber, fighter, air service, and troop-carrier. Gen Brereton formed Ninth Air Force in October 1943 expanded to eighteen fighter, 11 medium bombers, 14 transports, and 2 reconnaissance groups by D-Day. Ninth AF OVERLORD role was ground support under Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory's [**214**] AEAF. Its long-range fighters aided the Eighth bombers until OVERLORD. Medium bombers attacked the Luftwaffe in France driving air bases further inland.

Just before D-Day mediums wastefully struck 69 V-bomb launch sites seeking to destroy them. Instead, 30,000 sorties merely "reduced" the launch sites from 86 to 74 **215-216** and spared the enemy from larger pre-D-Day bombings.

3. The Bombing of French Railroads. The Luftwaffe defeat assured air supremacy for the land battles. Then arose the plan to strategically bomb German tactical targets; heresy for the bomber

commanders. December brought a massive effort on German rail traffic. Leigh-Mallory objected it was too massive. Then (zoologist turned bomb planner) Prof S. Zuckerman, AEAF scientific adviser, unveiled his “transportation plan” to duplicate his success in bombing Italian railroads. The stage was set for an epic tussle, but Zuckerman had proof that his Italy rail marshalling yard efforts paralyzed the railroads and had plans for three months of strategic bombing. Wasting 4-engine bombers on railyards was “heresy”. It challenged air claims strategic bombing alone could produce victory. Here attitudes, not facts, saw a “power struggle” **217** under Eisenhower. Leigh-Mallory’s Ninth Air Force agreed to the rail plan, but Gen Spaatz said his large bombers would not be diverted since his AAF would force a German surrender through bombing. Gen Doolittle, the new Eighth Air Force commander [**218**] opposed until after the GAF (*Luftwaffe*) was defeated.

Eisenhower had “implied” authority, not express, over strategic air, but not before D-Day. Gen Spaatz claimed railroads were ill-suited for heavy bombers – they were “tactical” targets. A CCS directive of 12 February to Eisenhower omitted giving him strategic air control. Eisenhower met Churchill who thought Bomber Command was independent; [**219**] unacceptable to both Eisenhower and Marshall. Ike told Churchill if he were not the “supreme” commander of all forces, he would “have to go home."

Eisenhower agreed his control of bombers was subject to CCS intervention to appoint Tedder deputy for "all operations under the control of OVERLORD." It was 9 March; it not the end. Next came objections to the Transportation Bombing Plan as **220** infeasible. Zuckerman had used his Italy data; French rails were different. Tedder backed Zuckerman in a “fox guarding the hen house” scenario. A huge Air Ministry meeting on 25 March saw Eisenhower adopt the rail plan; it was not over. With hubris, Bomber Command and Eighth Air Force objected to the deaths of thousands of French and Belgium citizens from their bombing. [**221-222**]

The British cabinet debated two weeks, but 18 April it cleared all but two rail targets. Attacks began late April when Eisenhower excluded heavily populated districts. Casualties were below the most optimistic estimates. On 16 May Churchill agreed – a bit late. Eisenhower took command of all air forces on 14 April issuing the transportation directive. Eisenhower let Spaatz bomb the German oil industry for an “all-out” effort [**223**] there and railroads in France and Belgium bombed by all air forces. Intelligence reported no impact since the Germans had three times more rail cars, eight times more locomotives, and ten times service facilities above minimums. But intelligence reports failed to analyze the cumulative effect or the critical damage. Coupled with D-Day rail sabotage, “the transportation system was on the point of total collapse” after D-Day as German forces needed trains to move forces and supplies. **224** Here was a major difference: the Germans lacked motor transports, so rails were their main transport mode.

Bombing aside, French railroads suffered from gross neglect. The 1940 war destroyed 500 structures and 1,200 buildings. Then Germans raided the locomotives (4,000 of 18,000) and cars (one-third of 480,000 freight cars). The French SNCF was severely strained, lacked personnel, maintenance and management, and incurred active sabotage both by FFI but its own railroad personnel. “French railroads were peculiarly sensitive to attack.” March attacks backlogged 1,600 trains by 30 April. They put le Mans yards out of operation for weeks through which Normandy and Brittany back logged trains rose from 30 to 228. In March 500 locomotives were destroyed. [**225**][**226**] The first victim were Atlantic Wall construction supplies. Then May attacks increased. OB West formed truck companies, so most units lost their motor transport. **227** The damage was unprecedented as 18,000 Organization Todt workers went from Atlantic Wall work to rail repairs. In May bridges over the Seine, Oise, and Meuse

Rivers were suddenly hit. Planners were convinced planes could not bomb bridges from Italian experience. "Success was spectacular!" Seine bridges dropped so on 26 May all Seine routes north of Paris were closed for 30 days. **228** **229**

"The unprecedented success of Zuckerman's idea, led to the maddening campaign of planes reporting on the status of bridge repairs so they were attacked just as the work finished." This fostered the OVERLORD plan to destroy bridges over the Seine and Loire Rivers beginning D-Day. "Zuckerman's program saved countless military lives during the first six weeks of the War" yet neither Tedder nor Zuckerman received much recognition. **(Map IV)** Then 21 May, "Chattanooga ("Choo-Choo") Day," fighter-bombers hit open tracks and small stations with perhaps 50 locomotives destroyed and 113 locomotives damaged. By D-Day 2,700 sorties were flown against rail targets. But the "Transportation Plan" affected the German Army more than the Allies realized. Negligible destruction saw French rail traffic decline 60% in March to 1 June. "In most heavily bombed Région Nord, three-quarters of the normal traffic was knocked off the rails. In the Région Ouest (the invasion zone) … bombed … lightly … (for) security, traffic declined by only 30 percent, but immediately after the assault it dropped even lower than in the Région Nord. These results were to prove critical in the battle for Normandy. **230**

I. 1944 Overlord and the Strategic Air Forces; Davis, COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE 16-30 April 1944

1. Events.

18 Apr: Eighth AF—one B-17 interned in Switzerland.
19 Apr: SHAEF &USSTAF—Gen Eisenhower allows two Eighth AF missions against synthetic oil.
21 Apr: Eighth AF—bad weather cancels first oil mission.
22 Apr: Eighth AF—bombs first transportation plan target. 330
22–23 Apr: Bomber Command—drops first 30-pound J incendiary bombs on Brunswick.
24 Apr: Eighth AF—13 B-17s and one B-24 interned in Switzerland.
25 Apr: Eighth AF—two B-24s land in Switzerland. Fifteenth AF—one B-24 lands in Switzerland.
29 Apr: Eighth AF—one B-17 interned in Sweden.
30 Apr: Fifteenth AF—reaches strength of 19 heavy bomber groups.

Another issue on 19 April had Spaatz seeking oil targets. Suddenly, German fighter resistance plummeted in raids on Berlin and Kassel losing only 15 bombers. It caused apprehension the Germans were conserving fighters for the invasion. So on 18-19 April, USSTAF "needed even more valuable targets to prod the Germans into fighting … (as) Spaatz's first and most important task the destruction of the Luftwaffe. **247** Plus, morale needed boosting. He "feared that the entire AAF strategic effort in Europe might fail …" Spaatz took his dissatisfaction to Eisenhower. "The two had a stormy meeting in the supreme commander's personal quarters." Spaatz may have revealed his clandestine bombing of Ploesti on 5 April and his secret Danube River mining campaign on 8 April had already begun to limit German oil supply from Rumania.

Eisenhower noted Spaatz had not bombed his transport targets and the need for Spaatz to support British V-1 bombing efforts that "rested on legitimate political concerns". Spaatz protested Crossbow's high priority. Eisenhower supported Teddar on crossbow, **248** but Spaatz's basic position to give Spaatz

two days more to attack. He likely scolded Spaatz for his transportation plan lacks. As of 19 April, the **Eighth had not bombed a single one of its assigned rail targets**. Yet, Eisenhower had no record of the meeting. Spaatz's diary lists the points discussed and permission from Eisenhower for two days to attack oil to gauge German reactions to get them up. The AAF history stated, "it seemed important … **not to go on record as taking the initiative in opening this new offensive."**

On 20 April Spaatz and Teddar agreed upon Crossbow's priority. They agreed to a "switch-off" one good day Crossbow, and two days for oil. That day 892 B-17s and B-24s struck Crossbow sites in France with no *Luftwaffe* opposition and nine bombers lost. In fact, not until 12 May did Spaatz again hit oil targets as the **249** interim had nine Crossbow missions – of 2,941 sorties; 33 bombers lost. The Eighth bombed Hamm, largest marshaling yard in Europe partially fulfilling his bargain with the supreme commander.

2. Churchill Delays the Transportation Plan. 1 May without Churchill approving the transport plan due to heavy civilian casualties. Spaatz worried: "The use of these forces … (for) so much destruction to our Allies … may far outweigh the advantages gained …" Eisenhower examined it but **the primary consideration was the absolute necessity of winning the war quickly**. Spaatz acquiesced and tried to mitigate French casualties with best lead bombardiers and no H2X bombing. "The crews must be impressed with **250** the need for air discipline … to avoid needless killing of French personnel." Churchill still delayed deciding to be against on 19 April. Churchill refused a timely decision. On 26 April he ended by putting it to the War Cabinet but only for attacks "that would inflict no more than 150 civilian casualties each." An impossible limit to observe.

On 29 April Churchill told Eisenhower bombing plans should limit civilian casualties to no more than 100 people. If it failed to achieve damage needed, at least they tried to reduce casualties. Eisenhower remained adamant against. He wrote to Marshall, "There is no other way in which this tremendous air force can help [the] U.S. during the preparatory period, to get ashore and stay there." On 2 May Eisenhower replied to Churchill reviewing the transportation plan rationale. **251** He noted USSTAF "fully and sympathetically considered" proposals to reduce loss, but rejected them because they did not "delay and disrupt enemy concentrations." His pat response was: "The 'Overlord' concept … (assumed) overwhelming Air Power would be able to prepare the way for the assault. If its hands are to be tied, the perils of an already hazardous undertaking will be greatly enhanced."

The War Cabinet considered Eisenhower's response. Churchill said he said he had not realized "that our use of air power … would assume so cruel and remorseless a form." The cabinet agreed that the prime minister "should consider further the air plan for support of 'Overlord.'" **252**

J. Chapter 6: OVERLORD Logistical Plan January to April 1944 – Artificial Port; Logistical Support of the Army, Vol I: Ruppenthal (1952) xyza

1. Portable Ports. Ruppenthal states the majesty of OVERLORD was its portable ports. "The Cross-Channel operation possessed logistical magnificence." Transporting an attacking force and artillery across the Channel in assault formation required detailed staging, substantial numbers of craft, and meticulous loading, especially when planning "did not begin until January 1944." On 1 February, the basic plan NEPTUNE issued by Joint lanners (*i.e.,* 21st Army Group, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and Allied Expeditionary Air Forces). U.S. First Army plans were 25 February and V and VII Corps plans were 27 March. The American Joint Administrative Plan was 19 April, and the Advance Section plans for the

D+15 to D+41 period followed. On 14 May, the France "COMMZ" plan was issued. A total of Eight detailed plans.

A key logistical point: Gen Bradley's Army controlled logistics until a "beachhead" and then a "lodgement" was captured. The first was definable; the second was not. Bradley's future "12TH Army Group" would activate two months after D-Day, so Bradley commanded the U.S. First Army until then. When Patton's Third Army activated, Gen Hodges would command First Army and Bradley commanded the new 12th Army Group. As the Allies advanced, front lines would be too far from the beaches for 12th Army Group control. Rear Army Group lines would move inland beginning when 12th Army was activated. Into the void between beaches and combat forces was the "logistic zone" with authority for all operations including civilians. It was "COMMZ" (Communications Zone).

PHOENIX Breakwaters



The enemy diligently destroyed all ports as **269** 10 divisions landed by D+5 with one division per day after that. Normandy-Brittany ports could support 30 divisions, but Brittany ports were far away, heavily fortified U-Boat bases. Considering these as future ports was an unfortunate "stretch". Small ports near beachheads could handle 1,300 tons/day. Capturing Cherbourg only added 3,750 tons/day in 30 days. Brittany ports were not planned until D + 60 -- completely unrealistic: 1) they were 260 miles away and 2) were destroyed as Naples had been. Thus, 18 divisions had to be supported over beaches month #1, 12 in month #2, down to only a few in month #3. "COSSAC planners considered the (beach) capacities … more than sufficient," but they were wrong. **270** Plans for discharges by September 1944 were "vastly overoptimistic".

Channel weather was unpredictable, precocious. Weather stations on Greenland and Iceland were crucial but: "Forecasting more than four days of fair weather was difficult". All depended upon a portable, artificial harbor to be towed across the Channel, but little was done. **271** COSSAC's plan "skipped" it to just sink 19 "blockships" to dampen waves against piers built on sunken vessels with pontoon bridges. COSSAAC ignored engineering, but required two ports in 14 days with breakwaters, piers/docks and cartage off with cargo. Then Admiralty objected to sinking ships!

Bubbling air breakwaters were rejected, **272** but "Lilo"[7] or "bombardons" were built to create a "swimming pool canvas float" using water-filled fabric keels. BOMBARDONS were "hollow concrete tubes 11 feet in diameter; with a 12' diameter canvas above water stabilized by submerged flooded bags and 750-ton concrete keel. They offered "quiet anchorage" for deep-draft Liberty type ships. Liberty Ships would anchor in this shelter unloaded by cargo lighters or small craft, such as DUKW boat-trucks. Inward was the massive concrete PHOENIX harbor "breakwaters"; huge, rectangular, tall concrete barges with weight and strength to bash Channel waves and be towable. **273-274** Next came floating truck roads and docks from incredibly shallow beach flats where low tide left a wet beach a quarter-mile

[7] A British beach air mattress.

wide and one mile from shore to cargo coater ship draft depths of 12 to 18 feet. Here deep standing, legged pierheads (docks) were winched up and down on "legs" as tides changed to connect to the shore using floating pontoon roadways.

This Lobnitz pierhead was a steel structure 200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 10 feet high, weighing 1,500 tons. The four corners of each section had 90' tall metal spud legs on winches and cables with legs retracted for towing but lowered to the beach bottom. Then 24-hours a day men cranked winches to lower and raise the pier platforms to adjust to the tides. The piers were for shallow draft LCT's, LST's and coasters. Liberty Ships anchored out unloaded by boats and lighters using the ship's cranes and winches. The flexible, floating steel road from pierhead to shore, the "WHALE" was on top of concrete and steel "beetles" (floating pontoons) that lay on the sand at low tide. **275-276**

By December 1943 nothing significant was decided when Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander. Construction had begun. BOMBARDONS and PHOENIXES were discussed, and names MULBERRY A (American) and MULBERRY B (British) were chosen. January decisions began PHOENIX work. Sunken ships gave sidewall protection to the harbors. Vehicle discharge was 1,250 per day (or one per minute 24-hours per day) with cargo unloading at the same time. Clearing goods off the beach was the next challenge. There were five harbors (2-U.S. and 3-U.K.). The Navy proposed five partial breakwaters, GOOSEBERRIES, 1,500 yards long using sunken ships (CORNCOBS) and 70 ships were sunk. **277** The OMAHA system was two square miles for 7 Liberty ships, 5 large coasters, and 7 medium coasters with WHALE floating road piers out 3,000 feet to the six Lobnitz pierheads unloading 5,000 tons of cargo and 1,400 vehicles/day. Two more ponton causeways were built at OMAHA and UTAH for small craft such as LCT's and barges.

Lobnitz Pierhead

The projects overtaxed British resources. Completion was a "darn close thing". **278** Mr. Ruppenthal convincingly lists sources used including 600 tug trips to tow the system across the English Channel in two weeks with 15,000 workers (many imported from Ireland -- a dangerous gamble given the tensions between the two countries.) **279** Begun in October, the project was one month behind in December with 240 firms involved When construction fell behind schedule in March and April, a U.S. Naval Combat Battalion (the 108th) was added. Lack of steel cut BOMBARDON's 20%. **280** **281** Some realized the Brittany ports for U.S. use would not be available for some time.

> The original plans for the artificial ports provided that they were to remain effective for ninety days, by which time deep water ports were expected to be restored … As early as March (1944) … the maintenance problem after D plus 90 revealed that the capacity of the ports … (was insufficient so the life of) the MULBERRIES … (had to be extended) and … (still be used) after D plus 120, even through the winter months … (If) the Seine ports were not captured … it would be essential to keep the MULBERRIES operating to maintain British forces … The necessity for prolonging the life of the MULBERRIES was immediately accepted, and … construction of an additional 20 PHOENIXES was therefore approved.

Most histories report there was no "fall back" plan after D + 90.

2. Beach Organization. Mr. Ruppenthal describes logistics tasks as other histories omit this "back story" on how soldiers were kept in the fight to rarely report the "force withdrew when it ran out of ammo" or "starving they pushed on". While supplies were not always great, most agree U.S. soldiers were "well off" -- an accolade of sorts to SOS efforts. Equaling important to battles was unloading, transporting and distributing equipment and supplies forward. OVERLORD beach efforts were novel in scope and length of time for beach logistics. Organizing OMAHA and UTAH Beaches **282** the vital work of First Army "engineer special bridges. Paraphrasing: Special brigades provided continuous movement of personnel, vehicles, and supplies to the "beach maintenance area" and into the first segregated supply dumps three miles inland. The brigades marked hazards, did emergency repairs, had medical facilities, directed boat traffic with landing, retraction and salvage of boats, coordinated with naval and merchant vessels, build and maintained roads, beach exits and storage, removed obstructions and mines, unloaded supplies, built facilities, guarded POW's, maintained traffic, police, bivouac and assembly areas, ran beach dumps, removed mines, obstacles and underwater obstructions; erected POW enclosures, kept order, controlled road traffic, provided bivouac, troop assembly, messing and hospitals, **283** moved supplies into and ran beach dumps, and kept records. Boring? Perhaps. Essential? Absolutely!

The name "engineer special brigade" is misleading, because it encompassed engineer, quartermaster, railhead companies, ordnance, medical, military police, chemical, and signal troops of 20,000 men. Engineer special brigades were specially designed..

MULLBERRY A -OMAHA BEACH (Ruppenthal)



> Within two hours (of landing) they … (completed) reconnaissance and beach marking … plan the layout of beaches … (and) erected beach markers … remove mines and obstacles … lay beach roadways, complete exits, establish collecting stations … controlling traffic … stockades … stranded craft … boat traffic … initial dump areas and motor parks … aid to water-stalled vehicles … (set up) command post, signals and assembly areas for troops, sign-posted … repaired roadways, opened exits … antiaircraft defense and dumps … (unload and) issue of supplies … in full operation by first day … **284**

Each beach brigade moved 3,300 tons of supplies into dumps to operate. The "men joked they were 'the troops which SOS considers combat, and the combat troops considered SOS.'"

3. May/Jun 1944. By the Eighth AF **"had eliminated the German Air Force as an offensive power."** The 23 April air plan required air superiority as:

a. D minus 50 to 30 (April 1944). Counter-air operations.

b. D minus 30 to 1 (May 1944). Targets in the order of (1) the German Air Force, (2) strategic railway centers, (3) selected coastal batteries, and (4) airfields within a radius of 130 miles of Caen.

c. D-Day. The night before paratroops dropped on the Cotentin Peninsula and British on the rivers Orne and Dives. In all, 54 fighter squadrons had beach cover, 15 shipping **138** cover, 36 support of ground forces, 33 air defense and 33 in reserve -- 171 squadrons.

After D-Day plan: 1) destruction of the *Luftwaffe;* 2) bombing Germany; 3) delay enemy reinforcements; 4) air transport, 5) ground forces support, and 6) reconnaissance. By D+40 a total of 116 fighter squadrons would be based in France.

On D-Day Allied the Allies had 3,467 heavy bombers, 1,645 medium, light, and torpedo bombers, 5,409 fighters, and 2,316 transport aircraft for a total of 12,837 against 3,222 German fighters and bombers … an overwhelming advantage in the air". **139** Incredibly complex communications connected Uxbridge to its air units and commanders in the invasion armada. Each of five headquarters ships had an air officer to control their air sections. Three fighter-direction ships guided the mass of planes for the OVERLORD fleet. Air support parties accompanied the assault forces to establish radio connections and relay targeting information. **140**

K. CHAPTER 13 OVERLORD and ANVIL Debates January to April 1944: *Global Logistics and Strategy*, Leighton and Coakley, Vol II xyza **30 April**

With the new year, 1944, strategic planning for Europe went forward with confidence OVERLORD would indeed occur as preparations "acquired a momentum of their own". The top commanders and principal commands were filled, and relationships settled. Resource allocations had finality and competition for assault shipping—eased as southeast Asia and eastern Mediterranean projects were off. ANVIL (south France) and OVERLORD had unquestioned precedence.

1. The Move to Strengthen Overlord. January brought an expected strengthening OVERLORD forces. Montgomery immediately wanted five oversized divisions in the first assault which cancelled NVIL. Eisenhower thought **322** 3-division lift adequate, so some conflict existed. But Morgan wanted extra craft for follow-up forces in a 3-sided issue and "backwards" since assault force size should dictate landing craft, not the reverse. But both the number of craft and assaulting infantry were arbitrary. Eisenhower arrived 16 January to adopt Montgomery's 5-division assault and 2-division follow-up using ordinary transports, not landing craft. On 23 January he sent CCS his assault shipping of 2 HQ ships, 47 LST's, 72 LCI (L)'s, and 144 LCT's which delayed D-Day to 1 June for another month of landing craft production. Eisenhower was in a bit of a "twist" having hoped for a 3-division ANVIL to now postpone it. The British endorsed a 5-dvision OVERLORD **323** hoping to make a South France invasion impossible. **324** It was then peripheral since plans had pushed the date to 6 June.

2. The Battle of Statistics. As final decisions were "final", half-decisions "came home to roost" beginning with the inability to agree upon the amount of assault lift available for two operations. Causes were difficult to understand:

> The picture of both existing and prospective assets had been clouded … by successive changes in production programs … by redeployment of vessels … and … constantly shifting (vessel) statistic … planning allowances … loss, attrition, and immobilization by repair … by the rapidly … changes in major strategic plans … In short, the staffs on both sides of the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean had lost track of their own calculations; the books were in a mess, and no … auditor was available to straighten them out. *(Comment" This is both an honest assessment and conclusion not found in other histories!)* As … British and American approaches influenced the use of statistics. Americans saw OVERLORD and ANVIL as **325** one. The British … (had) ANVIL … in third place and Italian campaign in second.

Washington planners wanted a 2-division ANVIL but used ANVIL craft to make OVERLORD stronger as it "became a battle of assumptions … since no one really knew the facts." *(Comment: A ship was not "overloaded" when it was deeper than its maximum water-line line. It was simply deeper than contemplated. If it functioned, exceeding its theoretical maximum loads was immaterial.)* In re-examining OVERLORD's new need five divisions "interpretation was the key".

Mid-December 1943 staffs raised ANVIL to three divisions per Eisenhower's new request to hastily conclude a lack of LST's. On 29 December, the MTO requested 15 more LST's and more LCT's for TORCH and for ANZIO as the 3-invasion debate dragged into January 1944. Then **326** the issue became "percent of craft 'serviceable'". At Quebec staffs adopted 90% for LST's, 85% for LCT's and LCI (L)'s; but actual Mediterranean experience had only 85% of LSTs, 80% LCI (L)s, and 75% LCTs operational Suddenly, it rebounded to 95% for all. The British objected:

> … (as an) officer proceeded to show that if 95 percent of the vessels … for OVERLORD could be made serviceable, additional lift for almost 9,000 personnel and 1,300 vehicles … would accrue. Another … (added) 26,000 personnel and 3,600 vehicles for OVERLORD and an additional 7,400 personnel and 700 vehicles for ANVIL. With no more effort than that required to punch the keys of the adding machine, here was a lift of more than 33,000 personnel and 4,300 vehicles …! **327**
>
> … (Using such) paper riches … Washington (planners saw) no need to divert any ANVIL shipping … (Then came Eisenhower's) recommendations for a 5-division OVERLORD … (with) the British Chiefs' enthusiastic endorsement … Eisenhower's … (added) requirements [were 6 combat loaders, 47 LST's, 72 LCI(L)'s, and 144 LCT's with] … no indication of the calculations …
>
> … Washington planners found it impossible to reconcile their own figures … (Thus, for) LCT's, the Washington planners estimated … 890 … while the theater estimated there would be only 636 … Washington planners conceded … (but U.S.) serviceability rates proved justified. **Actually, 99.3 percent of all U.S. assault shipping and 97.6 percent of all British assault shipping …on hand in the United Kingdom on D-day were used in the cross-Channel assault ...** **328**

Ultimately, U.S. planners won the "battle of statistics" when they proved even with lower U.K. rates of 90% and 85% for LST's and craft, OVERLORD still held 177,000 men and over 20,000 vehicles (7 divisions in personnel and 8 divisions in vehicles). Gen Handy proudly cabled 7 February: "Combined planners agree . . . there is lift for at least seven divisions . . . leaving a two-division ANVIL lift."

It was not over! **329** There were "regular" loads and "combat" loads -- the latter had more soldiers. Ignoring the obvious that a "regular" LST load should be for "combat", the ETO figured an OVELORD "division slice" 35,000, not 25,000, men as total men divided by total divisions. The normal "slice" was just 15,000 men. In effect, divisions were upsized 233% for the assault, but it was difficult to contest. The issue highlights the defects in early war plans for not recognizing amphibious assaults required much larger forces. **Gen Smith and Handy solved it after a final sharp wrangle on 9 February.** **330**

3. The Debate Moves to London. On the strategic level, British and American disagreements on ANVIL hardened. The U.S. Joint Chiefs stated: "A successful ANVIL assault is required (to use) … French forces and … U.S. divisions now in the Mediterranean … ANVIL is most important to the success of OVERLORD …" They adopted a mandatory south France attack with "as large an assault lift as possible." But no one knew the actual craft status: the British claimed a deficit, U.S. a surplus. Then the British refused to let Eisenhower make allocations as **331** the MTO war degenerated after the Anzio assault. The strong German reaction left the beachhead in peril. Suddenly, ANVIL was a "poor idea", which was a bit baffling since the British warmly supported the U.S. cost to raise 10 French African divisions to suddenly deny use of this force for its one purpose: invading France. *(Comment: A more likely U.S. reaction was shock and anger when the British proposed to strand a 10-division French force in Africa the U.S. raised at considerable cost and headaches. This factor appears overlooked).*

"Official" historians describe the need of U.S. officials felt for ANVI; the British saw it as a "diversion". The British wanted ANVIL canceled to keep a focus in the Mediterranean. U.S. Chiefs retaliated after Rome had been captured,

U.S. Chiefs made certain Italy was throttled back to a minimum since Italian forces were to only "contain" the Germans (and push them northward). Italy would "stabilize". France was the new active theater with OVERLORD and ANVIL. Italy would keep German forces from France. Along with the Soviet summer offensive, it was a perfect grand strategy to the U.S. **332** *(Comment: If not a bit of "payback" to the British. Unfortunately, the servicemen in Italy perceived they were "casts off's" and "also rans" in the war. It was certainly painful to "be fighting for your country" in a "backwater" theater!*

Then U.S. Joint Chiefs, who were firm on ANVIL, worried that Eisenhower "leaned British". Marshall wrote him: "… I merely wish to be certain that 'localitis' is not developing and that the pressures on you have not warped your judgment …" A startling statement by a boss! Eisenhower's "second", Gen Smith was pressed about undue British pressure upon Eisenhower. His reply to Marshall was not adequate as he merely "supported" a 5-division OVERLORD and a 2-division ANVIL. Marshall warned that the 2-division ANVIL issue was then "in the air."

Churchill sought a Combined Chiefs meeting. U.S. Joint Chiefs refused -- Eisenhower was their British representative. **333** Yet, fearing Eisenhower, the "joint" commander, was not sufficiently biased toward arguing U.S. positions, Gen Hull and Adm Cooke came to survey Eisenhower and convince the British. They proved OVERLORD lift was adequate if craft were loaded to capacity. They had Pacific data the British could not refute. Next, British Chiefs and Montgomery argued German artillery would cause far greater losses, but **334** then Hull and Cooke found the flaw --- the British had never tested or developed their own craft capacities. **There were no U.K. assault plans – no calculations – no relation of men, supplies and vehicles landed to ships available!** Monty, in a huff, effectively took a "my way or the highway" approach! British capacity equaled number of vehicles times number of men per vehicle –

not “walk-ons”! U.S. Col Lincoln quipped “…we are throwing away ANVIL … in return for the lift of a couple of thousand administrative vehicles on the third tide in landing craft … “ **335**

In February, the U.S. Navy “dug in” to cut OVERLORD and ANVIL LST’s; but “few thought this was final.” In London, Adm Cooke “horse traded” for 21st Army Group to give up 7 LST's and 30 LCI (L)'s **336** for 6 unwanted AKAs in equivalent lift.

In truth: the “British actually objected to any ANVIL operation at all …” with the U.S. having trained 10 French divisions to fight in France. The British saw their Italy theater as playing “second fiddle” and fought against being third chair in violin section behind ANVIL. **Their real object was to cancel all ANVIL operations. "The shadow of ANVIL … is already cramping General Wilson" in Italy.**

The German Anzio counterattacks threatened that MTO beach effort. Gen Alexander needed reinforcement “arguably ending ANVIL hopes!” The U.S. JCS refused to cancel ANVIL. **337** They reminded Eisenhower FDR promised ANVIL to Stalin at the point where Eisenhower felt ANVIL was no longer possible as German forces grew to oppose OVERLORD. Eisenhower championed “flexibility” as he deviated from the JCS Mediterranean views. On 22 February he agreed ANVIL was favored, but not the only option. The U.S. Chiefs compromised to require continued ANVIL planning with 2-divisions and a 10-division follow-up provided it did not interfere with the Italian battles **338** to be reviewed on 20 March. In truth: “Everything depended on Italy during the next four weeks.”
A three-way tussle: Italy was the British top priority – where mostly their troops fought; U.S. wanted OVERLORD and ANVIL; Eisenhower wanted a strong OVERLORD. Everyone wanted the cherished LST’s.

4. Anvil Postponed. The Anzio emergencies in Italy meant the MTO needed LST’s. **339** OVERLORD forces exchanged old for newer LST’s that could carry LCT’s on their decks -- a bonus. The disputes ended 10 March when Eisenhower sharply warned the Joint Chiefs not to skimp on OVERLORD assault shipping when **340** OVERLORD was "fifteen LST's short … (for) keeping ANVIL alive." Eisenhower said ANVIL was a forlorn hope. Surprise! Next day the U.S. Navy had a new schedule for 26 more LST's!

The U.S. Chiefs offered 13 LST's leave the MTO 20 March, the rest 28 April. British Chiefs agreed. LST's at Anzio paid off with 5,100 tons off-loaded on beaches/day. German artillery was pushed beyond beach range; unloading improved. Yet, Cassino attacks had failed and the spring offensive began 15 April to link Anzio and Rome, but its was not done until mid-June, which delayed ANVIL. **341**

Eisenhower refused to undercut the Mediterranean effort but in in the end “… the Americans could envisage no more profitable employment for the surplus Mediterranean forces than … southern France … (The) capture of Rome had lost its appeal …”

Then S.O.S. Gen Somervell found the problem -- the U.S. Navy was surreptitiously diverting too many landing ships to the Pacific. The shortage seemed “artificially enhanced”. **342** **“**Gen Somervell pounced on this telling Marshall too many craft were heading to the Pacific and perhaps ‘Eisenhower should be reinforced in combat loaders and landing craft at the expense of Nimitz …’”

In fact, the Navy faced a “problem of plenty”. Decisions in 1943 shot LST production from 28 new ships in March to 82 in May and thereafter over 40/month, which would flood the Pacific with LST’s. It explained the Navy’s uncharacteristic “generosity”.

By early 1944 the Navy was well set, if not overly so, for Pacific craft. **343** This did allow U.S. Chiefs to be "generous" to British to postpone for ANVIL efforts to connect Anzio to Allied lines. Of course, "they played it up" to inform the U.S. would reluctantly withdraw Pacific craft if the British signed of their good faith intention to launch ANVIL.

"This, as the British interpreted it, was more than a bribe; it was an ultimatum —" It was angrily received as the British were certain the Pacific was not short assault ships as was Europe. **344** Brooke told Eisenhower:

> … if our basic strategy, which was to defeat Germany first, had been adhered to, the landing craft required for ANVIL would (not) now be … be in the Pacific … He considered … (it a) failure to adhere strictly to the basic strategy … (that had) setback … (by) approximately six months in the defeat of Germany. Furthermore … the lack of sufficient landing craft … resulted in our failure to take full advantage of the fall of Italy.

The Joint Chiefs sensed (per Sir John Dill) an "undercurrent of (British) resentment … which may even have been decisive in the outcome."[8] Resentments abounded on both sides. Americans **345** objected to a delayed Italy spring offensive believing British lacked "whole-hearted commitment to OVERLORD." The British in anger said: "The implication that in the British view Mediterranean strategy is any less subservient to OVERLORD than in the American view is particularly painful … "Yet, they refused to make an immediate ANVIL decision. The point is made! **346** Instead, the Chiefs directed Wilson to use his discretion to fight in Italy or send forces to south France with the escort fighters. The Allied victory … in early 1944 … (was) in the last analysis a by-product of the strategic bombing offensive.

L. April 16 - 30, 1944: Buresh Eighth AF Bombing Logs Excel Format, xyza.

The authors repeat (after exculpatory "what ifs") if Allied intelligence had realized the integration of oil, synthetic rubber, and chemical industries and their vulnerability, **64** the CBO could have attacked sooner to force the GAF to defend like it did the aircraft industry. The authors conclude the better choice was plane engines, not airframes.

The allies also failed to follow-up attacks either at all or soon enough -- especially in 1943 for aircraft and ball bearings. Faulty intelligence partially caused failures in the daylight offensives: follow-up attacks were not soon enough -- it was the thing German industrial authorities most feared.

Beyond information, in 1943 neither the Eighth nor Fifteenth had the bombers or, **65** even worse, long-range escort needed. Next, the Italian strategic air forces were supposed to "whip-saw" Germany with bombers from two directions, but Italian bombers rarely ascended the Alps, which was due, in part, to to lack of knowledge concerning flying over the Alps in the winter.

Second, technology did not exist for the two forces to impactfully coordinate their bombing missions, let alone actual bombing runs. Third, the Mediterranean Theater ground war kept the bombers employed. Yet, the Fifthteenth "rang the bell" with it successful attacks on the Ploesti oil plants. Thus, were the

[8] Here may reside one clue to Gen Marshall's abiding loyalty to Sir John Dill and his final resting place in Arlington Cemetery.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE DAILY RECORDS

				B-17's				B-24's				US Bomb Crew			Lutwaffe			P-38 & P-47 Escort				P-51 Esc0rt				Lutwaffe			US Crews		
No.	Mission	Area	Type	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	KIA	WIA	MIA	Dwn	Rep	50%	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Los	Dam	Prob	KIA	WIA	MIA
Mon, 17 APR 1944			Small																												
304	Wizernes	Fran	V-1					14	0	0	0							33	0	0	0										
305	Rennes	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0																								
Tue, 18 APR 1944			781																												
306.1	Oranienburg	Germ	Air	275	3	0	90					0	0	29	33	5	19	119	1	3	7								0	0	
306.2	Oranienburg	Germ	Air	210	14	0	94					2	12	139				296	1	0	3										
306.3	Brandenburg	Germ	Indus					248	2	0	20	0	5	20								219	3	0	18						
307	Stavanger	Norwa	Info	5	0	0	0																								
Wed, 19 APR 1944			799																												
308.1	Kassel	Germ	Air	271	5	0	119					1	5	47	17	1	6	127	0	0	0					16	1	2	0	0	
308.2	Lippstadt	Germ	Air	243	0	0	21					2	8	55				439	0	4	0										
308.3	Paderborn	Germ	Air	230	0	1	10					1	3	8								151	2	0	5						
308.4	Watten	Fran	V-1					27	1	0	0							47	0	0	0										
Thr, 20 APR 1944			847																												
309.1	Pas Calais	Fran	V-1	457	7	1	309					2	25	69				300	0	0	0	88	2	1	0	8	0	2	0	0	
309.2	Pas Calais	Fran	V-1					113	2	2	36	10	9	20																	
309.3	Cambrai	Fran	Air																			34	0	0	0						
309.4	St Trond	Belg	Cancel																												
310.1	Nantes	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0																								
310.2	*CARPETBAGGER Fr. Resis. FFI*							6	0	0	0																				
Sat, 22 APR 1944			808																												
311.1	Hamm	Germ	Rails	459	8	1	138					0	7	89	20	6	8	617	7	1	22	242	6			40	2	16	0	1	1
311.2	Hamm	Germ	Rails					265	7	14	59				46	28	64														
312	Orleans	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0											0													
Sun, 23 APR 1944			Small																												
313.1	Laon	Fran	Air															136	2	2	2					1	0	1	0	0	
313.2	Lebubgen	Belg	Air															166	5	0	19					7	0	22	0	0	
313.3	Unknown		Air																			80		0	2	3	0	1	0	0	
314.1	Rennes	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0																								
314.2	*CARPETBAGGER Fr. Resis. FFI*							9	0	0	0																				
Mon, 24 APR 1944			767																												
315.1	Erding	Germ	Air	268	27	0	112					4	22	260	124	6	58	131	0	1	7					4	1	0	0	0	
315.2	Friedrichshafen	Germ	Indus	232	9	0	119					7	4	71				490	5	0	15					38	1	16	0	0	1
315.3	Gablingen	Germ	Air					219	4	0	26	0	1	40								246	12	0	8	85	4	22	0	0	1
316.1	Amsterdam	NInd	Info	5	0	0	0																								
316.2	*CARPETBAGGER Fr. Resis. FFI*							8	0	0	0																				
Tue, 25 APR 1944			560																												
317.1	Mannheim	Germ	Rails					31	5	0	26	1	4	49				177	0	1	2					5	0	9	0	0	
317.2	Metz	Fran	Air	142	2	0	33					1	3	20				296	0	0	3					5	0	8	1	0	
317.3	Dijon	Fran	Air	121	0	0	29					0	0	2								246	2	1	1	24	7	26	0	0	
317.4	Wizernes	Fran	V-1					27	0	0	0							40	0	0	0										
318	Calais	Fran	Info	6	0	0	0																								
Wed, 26 APR 1944			656																												
319.1	Brunswick	Germ	Indus	344	0	2	121					9	3	0				401	1	1	0	153	4	0	0				1	0	
319.2	Paderborn	Germ	Indus	Cancelled							18	1	0	0																	
319.3	Cognac	Germ	Cancel															43	0	0	0	47	0	0	0	2	0	0			
319.4	LeMans	Fran	Air															33	0	0	0										
319.5	Cormeilles	Fran	Air																			28	0	0	0						
320	Ghent	Belg	Info	5	0	0	0																								
Thr, 27 APR 1944			622																												
322	Pas Calais	Fran	V-1	307	3	0	227	169	1	2	25	3	16	40				309	1	0	0	48	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	
323.1	Nancy	Fran	Air	163	2	0	33					0	0	20				106	0	0	0					3	0	1			
323.2	Ostend	Belg	Air	118	2	0	29					1	0	20				283	4	0	2					4	0	5			
323.3	Blainville	Fran	Rails					190	0	2	22	24	6	1								154	0	0	1				0	0	
324.1	Cambrai	Fran	Info	5	0	0	0																								
324.2	CARPETBAGGER French Underground FFI							21	1					10																	
324.3	Roye	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot														52	0	0	0										
324.4	Albert	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot														36	0	0	6										
324.5	Cormeilles	Fran	Air	Dive Bomb																		17	0	0	0						
Fri, 28 APR 1944			296																												
325.1	Avord	Fran	Air	116	2	0	38					0	0	20				118	0	0	0	87	2	0	2	8	0	5	0	0	
325.2	Sottevast	Fran	V-1	18	2	0	47						3	21				46	0	0	0										
325.3	Tours	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot														44	1	0	1										
325.4	Chateaudun	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot														52	0	1	0										
325.5	Chateaudun	Fran	Air	Dive Bomb														4	0	0	0	1	0	1							
325.6	Marquise	Fran	V-1					47	0	1	6	0	9	0				50	0	0	0										
325.7	Paris	Fran	Air	Dive Bomb														24	0	0	0										
326.1	Antwerp	Belg	Info	5	0	0	0																								
326.2	CARPETBAGGER French Underground FFI							21	0	0	0																				
Sat, 29 APR 1944			683																												
327.1	Berlin	Germ	Rails	210	10	0	150					1	7	100	95	33	48	117	0	0	7								0	1	1
327.2	Berlin	Germ	Rails	196	28	0	161					4	20	260				463	0	1	16										
327.3	Berlin	Germ	Rails					212	25	2	121	13	11	246								234	0	0	7						
328.1	Northern	Fran	Info	4	0	0	0																								

"shortcomings of the American strategic bombing effort in this pre-invasion phase of the CBO." This cannot obscure the:

… larger … simpler fact that the daylight bombing offensive did succeed. True, it failed to achieve all the objectives … But in conclusion let the reader bear well in mind that by 1 April 1944 the GAF was a defeated force, and that in bringing about its defeat the bomber crews and fighter pilots of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces played a large, indeed a decisive, part**. 66**

Could not by itself have carried the battle to the enemy. It was in a frantic effort to defend the industries … that the GAF attempted and for which it was defeated.

EIGHTH AIR FORCE DAILY RECORDS

				B-17's				B-24's				US Bomb Crew			Lutwaffe			P-38 & P-47 Escort				P-51 Escort				Lutwaffe			US Crews		
No.	Mission	Area	Type	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	KIA	WIA	MIA	Lost	Rep	50%	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Fly	Dwn	Fin	Rep	Lost	Dam	50%	KIA	WIA	MIA
Fri, 28 APR 1944			296																												
325.1	Avord	Fran	Air	116	2	0	38					0	0	20				118	0	0	0	87	2	0	2	8	0	5	0	0	2
325.2	Sottevast	Fran	V-1	18	2	0	47						3	21				46	0	0	0										
325.3	Tours	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot														44	1	0	1										1
325.4	Chateaudun	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot														52	0	1	0										
325.5	Chateaudun	Fran	Air	Dive Bomb														4	0	0	0	1	0	1							
325.6	Marquise	Fran	V-1					47	0	1	6	0	9	0				50	0	0	0										
325.7	Paris	Fran	Air	Dive Bomb														24	0	0	0										
326.1	Antwerp	Belg	Info	5	0	0	0																								
326.2	CARPETBAGGER French Underground FFI							21	0	0	0																				
Sat, 29 APR 1944			683																												
327.1	Berlin	Germ	Rails	210	10	0	150					1	7	100	95	33	48	117	0	0	7								0	1	12
327.2	Berlin	Germ	Rails	196	28	0	161					4	20	260				463	0	1	16										
327.3	Berlin	Germ	Rails					212	25	2	121	13	11	246								234	0	0	7						
328.1	Northern	Fran	Info	4	0	0	0																								
328.2	CARPETBAGGER French Underground FFI							14	0	0	0																				
Sun, 30 APR 1944			319																												
329.1	Lyon	Fran	Air	114	1	0	8					0	0	10	3	0	6	128	1	0	1					18	1	5	0	0	1
329.2	Clermont	Fran	Air	118	0	0	9					0	0	0				268	0	0	4					11	0	17			
329.3	Siracourt	Fran	V-1					52	0	0	3	0	0	1								248	4	1	6	20	0	17	0	1	3
329.4	Tours	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot														44													
329.5	Fomorantin	Fran	Air	Dive Bomb														14								9	1	5			
330	Zwolle	Belg	Info	4	0	0	0						36																		
331.1	Orleans	Fran	Air	Droopsnoot									15					82	0	0	5	51	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
331.2	CARPETBAGGER French							20	0	0	0		51																		
Mnth Ttl Sort's				**9,521**	363	27	4129	**4343**	188	35	862	243	577	5447	724	179	364	**14759**	201	33	366	6028	154	10	114	1377	66	1001	10	7	279
Mnth Ttl Sort's All				**13,864**											2101	245		**20787**													
YTD TOTAL SORTIES				**25,390**	954	100	8849	**9604**	382	88	1673	710	1289	12950	2428	541	946	**38812**	366	88	573	10243	266	26	141	2530	202	1597	20	31	594
YTD TOTAL B-17 & -24/FIGHTER SORTIES				**34,994**											**4958**	**743**		**49055**													
YTD LOSSES B-17 & -24/FIGHTERS					3.8%				4.3%										1%				3%								
YTD % SORTIES FOR EACH				73%				27%										79%				21%									

In April, the bombers flew 13,864 sorties with B-17's still doubled those of the B-24's. Yet, YTD bomber sorties were only 25,400, meaning April flew one-half of the sorties so far that year. With fighters, YTD sorties was a huge 35,000 flights. Despite the harrowing tales in the histories, the B-17's suffered 3.8% and B-24's lost 14.4% of their aircraft – tolerable losses for statistics, perhaps not so much for the airmen. By April 1944, the P-51 Mustang still lagged the P-38 and P-47 fighters in quantity. Amazingly, just 1% and 3% of the fighters were lost in April -- an unheard-of low number. U.S. Bomber crews had 243 killed with 5,447 missing in April, the missing number is 1,289 were wounded. Conversely, fighter crews had just 20 killed and 594 MIA by 30 April 1944. Compare that to the *Luftwaffe* who had lost an estimated 4,958 fighter planes the first four months of 1944!

But the true figures are 39,000 and 49,000 big bomber and fighter sorties flown in the first four months of 1944 – that's 90,000 flights without the Mediterranean's Fifteenth AAF!

